Chapter Seventy: Flames of War
July 31st: The Imperial Foreign Minister, Bernstorff, formally delivered an ultimatum to Russia and France. The ultimatum, built on the demand for mutual withdrawal and the cessation of war mobilizations, explicitly required a clear response from Russia and France within twenty-four hours, and action within forty-eight hours, or else the Empire would consider Russia’s mobilization and France’s covert preparations as hostile acts.
According to custom, if France and Russia acted in hostility, the Second German Empire had the right to declare war.
On this day, France and Russia held urgent consultations. Like the Second German Empire, both nations hesitated over the issue of war, and for the same reason: Britain’s position remained uncertain.
Though eleven years earlier, Britain and France had signed a secret agreement to contain the Second German Empire, sparking two Moroccan crises and nearly leading to war, Britain’s European policy never changed in substance. Maintaining the strategic balance among continental powers remained its fundamental principle. As a result, until Britain made a precise judgment of each side’s war potential, it would not readily take a stance. Even though the Second German Empire had become a naval threat, Britain would not immediately turn hostile.
Thus, France and Russia wavered. Although their combined national strength surpassed that of the Second German Empire and Austria-Hungary, neither had enough confidence in their war potential.
The question was: could France and Russia accept the ultimatum from the Second German Empire?
Undoubtedly, the answer was no. Even if the Tsar and the French President felt uncertain, politically, compromise was impossible; otherwise, France and Russia would suffer a disastrous diplomatic defeat.
Consequently, France and Russia ignored the ultimatum from the Second German Empire.
August 1st: Hours before the ultimatum expired, the French parliament approved the mobilization bill submitted by the President, formally launching full war mobilization.
Soon after, the German Emperor signed the order for mobilization.
That evening, four hours after the ultimatum expired, the Emperor recalled the Imperial Ambassador to Russia, Friedrich von Pourtalès, formally severed diplomatic relations with Russia, and delivered a declaration of war. Simultaneously, the Emperor dismissed Bernstorff, whose performance during the crisis had proved inadequate, and appointed Gottlieb von Jagow as Imperial Foreign Minister, effecting a major shake-up in the Foreign Ministry.
It is said that when Pourtalès handed the declaration of war to the Russian Foreign Minister, the two embraced and wept bitterly.
The flames of war were about to ignite; the diplomats’ stage drama had closed, and now it was the soldiers’ turn.
That night, the Second German Empire’s war machine roared to life. Though the Empire had not carried out full mobilization before, it possessed the world’s finest military system, and its army was the first to enter a state of war.
By August 1st, all regular units and eighty percent of reserve forces had completed war preparations.
On the Western Front, 120 divisions were fully manned, with sixty more gathering, expected to be ready by August 4th. Near the Belgian border, millions of tons of war supplies had been stockpiled, and the extensive rail network was transporting troops and materiel at a rate of 1,200 trains per day. Born in the fires of war, the Second German Empire once again demonstrated Europe’s, and indeed the world’s, most efficient military mobilization just as war threatened to break out.
Compared to this, France and Russia’s mobilization paled in comparison.
By the night of August 1st, France had mobilized only forty divisions of regular troops, and almost all reserve units remained unprepared for war.
On the Eastern Front, the Empire’s Eighth and Ninth Corps had mobilized as well.
According to Moltke the Younger’s plan, the Eighth Corps would be sent to the Western Front, with only the Ninth Corps defending the east. However, opposite them, Russian mobilization was even slower, hampered by poor transportation, making it impossible for Russia to mass enough troops in August for an attack.
The military situation greatly favored the Empire.
In a sense, Moltke’s insistence on a flawed strategy stemmed from this. He believed France’s imperfect mobilization mechanism and faulty defensive deployment were fatal weaknesses; exploiting them would allow the Imperial Army to swiftly defeat France.
Thus, numerous Imperial Army commanders firmly supported Moltke.
At the time, only a few generals recognized the problem and voiced their concerns. Ludendorff, for instance, repeatedly stressed that Moltke’s forces on the right wing—the main axis for the grand turning maneuver—were too thin to sustain the offensive before Paris could be captured. Though Ludendorff’s advice, backed by the Crown Prince, led Moltke to transfer the Eighth Corps eastward, the troops allocated for the main assault on Paris remained stretched thin.
In the early hours of August 2nd, at Moltke’s insistence, the German Army undertook a "preventive action," marching into Luxembourg.
In Moltke’s plan, Luxembourg was the first central pivot and the weakest link most vulnerable to a French counterattack as the German offensive began. He believed that to launch the grand turning maneuver smoothly, the army had to enter Luxembourg in advance, preventing a French breakthrough against the German center.
Clearly, Moltke overestimated the French Army, or perhaps adhered too rigidly to convention. Given the circumstances, if the German Army attacked as planned, the French would be hard-pressed to adjust their defensive deployments, let alone counterattack.
Moltke’s move lacked political consideration. After the Franco-Prussian War, Luxembourg—an independent member of the German Confederation—had its independence recognized by all the great powers, including the Second German Empire, while France held responsibility for its status. The German Army entering Luxembourg gave France a legitimate reason to declare war, one untainted by the muddled Balkan issue.
That morning, France formally declared war on the Second German Empire, citing the German invasion of Luxembourg.
August 3rd: The Second German Empire formally declared war on France.
On this day, the most significant event was not the declaration of war against France but the Imperial Foreign Minister Jagow presenting King Albert I of Belgium with the Emperor’s ultimatum, demanding that Belgium open its borders to allow the German Army passage, with the Empire guaranteeing Belgium’s security.
By then, more than a million German troops massed on the Belgian border were poised to invade.
Albert I had less than ten hours to decide. According to Moltke’s plan, the German Army would commence its march into Belgium at dawn on August 4th at the latest.
Clearly, the army could not alter its operational plan at the last moment.
The war plan, drafted by Field Marshal Schlieffen and modified by Moltke, involved over a million troops, millions of tons of supplies, tens of thousands of railway workers, and thousands of trains. Like a vast, intricate machine, any small change could cause the entire apparatus to collapse.
Regardless of whether King Albert agreed to allow passage, the German Army would enter Belgium.
Unfortunately, at the final moment, King Albert refused Germany’s request, instead issuing a mobilization order, placing Belgium on a war footing.
At dawn on August 4th, the German Army crossed the border into Belgium.
The Germans’ first objective was the fortress of Liège, which barred the routes to Brussels and France—a formidable stronghold within Belgium. To execute the grand turning maneuver smoothly, the Germans had to capture this fortress; otherwise, their right wing would be severed en route, the three outer corps would be unable to continue, and the advance on Paris would stall.
That day, the German Army’s operations in Belgium met little resistance. Though Albert I had issued the mobilization order and the Belgian forces began to assemble, the German advance was swifter; Belgian troops had no time to organize an effective defense.
Outside the battlefield, the real crisis was approaching.
Upon learning of the German invasion of Belgium, British Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith went to Parliament that morning to formally propose a declaration of war against the Second German Empire.
Even then, many MPs argued Britain should remain neutral rather than plunge into continental war, but the Treaty of London was binding—Britain bore an unshirkable responsibility for Belgium’s independence, and King Albert had issued a plea.
After hours of intense debate, at four o’clock in the afternoon, the House of Commons passed the war bill.
Immediately, Asquith declared war on the Second German Empire, citing its invasion of Belgium and the violation of Belgian independence.
Interestingly, at this point, Asquith and many other British statesmen believed that Britain’s entry would bring the war to an end within months, forcing the Second German Empire to withdraw from Belgium and accept a British-brokered reconciliation.
Thus, when Britain formally declared war, Foreign Minister Grey handed a mediation proposal to the German ambassador, offering to arbitrate if the Empire withdrew its troops and restored the prewar status quo.
Britain’s action was absurd.
Perhaps Asquith and his peers thought Britain’s involvement would pressure the Second German Empire into accepting a ceasefire.
But once the war began, the German war machine could not be stopped.
Even if the Emperor were willing to accept Britain’s proposal and negotiate with France and Russia, the generals would never agree. At that time, even Moltke’s opponents, such as Hindenburg and Ludendorff, believed the army’s operations were proceeding smoothly and were confident of swiftly defeating France.
On the other side, France and Russia were unlikely to sit down for talks.
Austria’s army had already invaded Serbia; Russia could not expect or demand Austria-Hungary’s withdrawal through negotiation. As long as Russia wished to fight, France could not extricate itself. Moreover, France and Russia believed the advantage was not with the Second German Empire; once Russian mobilization was complete, Germany would be overwhelmed. Four million Russian troops, plus six million reservists, represented a terrifying military force.
As for Austria-Hungary, with Germany now at war, it would not easily relent.