Chapter Forty-Seven: The Moroccan Crisis

The Moroccan crisis erupted sooner than Feng Chengqian had anticipated.

After Britain dispatched troops to Sudan under the pretext of Egypt, France tacitly acknowledged British rule in Egypt and struck a secret deal: France promised not to interfere with British actions in Egypt, while Britain recognized French interests in Morocco. This secret agreement was a blatant violation of the Treaty of Madrid signed in 1880, which guaranteed equal commercial rights and privileges to all foreign nations and their citizens in Morocco.

On March 4, 1902, the German Emperor convened a council before the throne to deliberate specifically on the Moroccan question.

The news was confirmed: with the backing of Britain and Russia, France had officially proposed to Morocco a "reform" process under its supervision.

Was Morocco truly important?

If it were merely another colony, Morocco would be insignificant, for this North African nation possessed neither resources, nor market, nor labor force.

But Morocco was not a mere colony.

Situated at the gateway to the Strait of Gibraltar, with Tangier as one of North Africa’s finest harbors, its geographic and strategic value was immense.

If the Empire wished to pursue ambitions in the Mediterranean and join forces with Italy to contain France, it had to secure Morocco.

Thus, Morocco’s strategic value extended not only over North Africa but directly influenced the Empire’s alliance strategies on the European continent.

The council lasted only half an hour; with the support of numerous ministers, the Emperor resolved to intervene.

The Empire could not turn a blind eye to French actions in Morocco; otherwise, its prestige in Europe and its ties with Italy and other Mediterranean powers would suffer. Should France gain full control over Morocco, the Empire would lose its strategic advantage on the continent.

The Emperor’s decision was straightforward: even through war, the Empire’s interests in Morocco must be safeguarded.

Feng Chengqian’s mission was clear: the Imperial Navy was to mobilize for war, prepare for hostilities with France, and, should war break out, blockade French Atlantic ports.

On March 6, Imperial Chancellor Caprivi formally sent a diplomatic note to France, demanding an immediate halt to unilateral actions in Morocco and a positive response within twenty-four hours, failing which the German Empire would initiate war mobilization at 6 p.m. on March 7.

What did war mobilization mean?

Since the Franco-Prussian War, Clausewitz and other military theorists had established that war mobilization was tantamount to war itself.

The following day, France formally replied, asserting that its actions in Morocco did not harm the interests of other nations.

Since France did not renounce its unilateral actions, Frederick III, on the afternoon of March 7, signed a partial mobilization order submitted by Waldersee.

Within the next twenty-four hours, forty divisions stationed in the Empire’s western regions completed mobilization.

France, in turn, initiated its own partial mobilization.

Thus, war clouds gathered thick over continental Europe.

As the Imperial Army mobilized, the Navy moved swiftly as well. On March 10, five modern capital ships—the Emperor Frederick, Emperor William, Crown Prince William, Prince Carl, and Empress Augusta—were readied for departure. Even four ancient Saxony-class ironclads stoked their boilers, and dozens of other warships prepared for action.

The crisis struck so suddenly that Feng Chengqian could not summon Tirpitz back from the Far East, nor did he trust the other naval commanders; he had no choice but to take command himself. Yet Feng Chengqian held only an honorary military rank and was not a true soldier. According to Imperial regulations, "civilian soldiers" like him had no right to command a fleet in battle, let alone serve as fleet admiral. Only career officers could lead a fleet to sea.

Fortunately, Feng Chengqian was surrounded by professionals.

On March 11, Feng Chengqian accompanied Crown Prince William to Wilhelmshaven. The Crown Prince was not only a cavalry colonel in the Imperial Army but also a rear admiral in the Navy. Though somewhat junior in rank to command a fleet, as heir to the throne, none dared object.

The key question was whether war would actually break out.

In Feng Chengqian’s view, war was unlikely; France was not prepared to fight the Empire, nor was the Empire ready for war with France. Furthermore, Britain and Russia, who covertly supported France, were themselves unprepared for war; none wished to fight at this juncture.

The Emperor and his advisors were well aware of this.

The Empire’s forty divisions deployed in the west could not defeat France, much less repeat the Battle of Sedan. By even the most conservative estimates, eighty to a hundred divisions would be needed to swiftly overcome France.

Here lay the problem.

Mobilizing a hundred divisions would take at least a month, during which time France would also mobilize.

Clearly, flaws existed in the Empire’s military system.

But it was better that these flaws were exposed than concealed.

In these few days alone, many Imperial commanders realized that military reform was imperative; otherwise, defeating the Franco-Russian alliance in a future war would be impossible.

The most clear-sighted among them was General Schlieffen, poised to succeed Waldersee as Chief of the General Staff.

At the end of March, Schlieffen submitted a reform plan to the Emperor, urging that reforms begin at the foundation: first, by enhancing the strategic mobility of the Imperial Army, chiefly by improving the railway network, so that troops on both eastern and western fronts could be rapidly redeployed in wartime.

By then, however, the Emperor had already departed for Morocco.

On March 27, Emperor Frederick III made an official visit to Tangier, declaring that the German Empire would safeguard Morocco’s independence and that all powers would enjoy absolute equality of rights there. That same day, Chancellor Caprivi advised the signatories of the Treaty of Madrid to bring the Moroccan question before an international conference. Shortly after, Caprivi issued another ultimatum to France.

For Germany and France, this was a contest of wills.

Who would endure the longest?

As April began, the Empire’s mobilization did not slow; it expanded from standing army to reserves, with seventy-five divisions now concentrated on the western front. However, fewer than fifty were at full strength, while the remainder were in an unsatisfactory state.

France’s situation was even worse.

By April, France had mobilized fewer than fifty divisions, only thirty of which were at full strength, and fewer than four hundred thousand French troops were assembled along the Franco-German border.

If war broke out now, even if the German Empire could not gain the upper hand, France would suffer a crushing defeat.

More importantly, the longer the crisis dragged on, the worse it would be for France.

The reason was simple: within two months, the German Empire would complete its preparations for war, with over 1.2 million troops massed on the western front, while France could muster at most eight hundred thousand by then, with other preparations not complete until the end of July. If the Moroccan crisis could not be resolved diplomatically, the German Empire might well strike by mid-June.

Did France have any way out?

In the short term, Britain was of no help. Even if Britain, for Egypt’s sake, stood behind France, it would never risk embroilment in a continental war. The reason was clear: Britain’s economic situation was poor, and neither Parliament nor the public would permit the cabinet to intervene in a Franco-German conflict.

As for Russia, it was even less reliable.

Though Russia boasted a vast army and the world’s second-largest navy, it enjoyed no real advantage on the European battlefield. Its navy was divided into three fleets, and the Baltic Fleet alone could not tie down the German navy. On land, poor transportation infrastructure severely limited Russian capabilities.

Militarily, if war erupted in mid-June, France could not hope for British or Russian support before year’s end.

The crucial question was whether France could hold out alone for six months.

Clearly, neither French politicians nor military officers had such confidence. Only thirty-two years had passed since the Battle of Sedan, and most senior French generals bore deep scars from that defeat, leading to a prevailing belief that France could not defeat the German Empire unaided.

If victory was impossible, negotiation was the only option.

At the end of May, the French Army’s General Staff submitted a report to the government, stating unequivocally that if the German Empire completed war preparations first and launched an attack, France would be defeated within six months. Thus, unless Britain clearly pledged military support, the best course was diplomatic negotiation, not reckless war.

If even the military held this view, politicians were hardly better disposed.

On June 4, the French cabinet held an emergency meeting. With most ministers insisting on a negotiated settlement, the hardline Foreign Minister Delcassé tendered his resignation.

Two days later, Delcassé formally stepped down, with Prime Minister Rouvier assuming the foreign portfolio.

Rouvier immediately approached the German Chancellor Caprivi, expressing France’s willingness to resolve the Moroccan issue through sincere negotiation.

In truth, at that moment, the German Empire had not completed its own war preparations.

Even after ten more days, by June 20, the German Empire would still not be ready. The main reason was the inadequacy of the railway system; while most troops had reached the western front, supplies for the front lines were extremely limited, and sufficient stockpiles could not be accumulated before the end of August.

Since France was willing to negotiate, Caprivi had no reason to refuse.

To demonstrate good faith, on June 11 the Emperor sent Feng Chengqian a telegram, ordering him to lead the Imperial Fleet, which had entered the North Sea, back to Wilhelmshaven.

On July 7, after nearly a month of tense negotiation, with Britain and Russia mediating, Germany and France agreed to convene a conference of the signatories to the Treaty of Madrid.

Thus, the Moroccan crisis was finally laid to rest.