Chapter 101: Long-Range Battle

The battleship "Prinz Heinrich" did not retreat—not out of bravado, but because if it withdrew, the British ships would shift their fire onto the "Prinz Carl" ahead. In other words, every extra minute the "Prinz Heinrich" held out meant one more chance for the "Prinz Carl" to survive.

By eleven o’clock, the "Prinz Heinrich" had been struck more than ten times, including at least eight large-caliber armor-piercing shells.

Although the other five battlecruisers were also in dire straits—for instance, the "Derfflinger" had taken at least five hits from 300mm or larger shells, and even the least damaged "Kronprinz Wilhelm" had been hit by three large-caliber shells—the damage to the "Prinz Heinrich" was the most severe.

When Admiral Hipper’s main fleet arrived, the bow of the "Prinz Heinrich" was already submerged beneath the waves.

With Hipper’s arrival, Rader’s steadfastness and sacrifice finally bore fruit.

For Hipper, the most urgent task was to immediately engage in battle and allow Rader to withdraw.

Before entering the battlefield, Hipper arranged his formation: seventeen battleships led by the High Seas Fleet flagship "König," deployed in column formation. Upon spotting Jellicoe’s main fleet, Hipper ordered a graceful column left turn, cutting diagonally into the battle at a heading of 285 degrees. Meanwhile, Rader began slowing down and turned left as Hipper approached.

This maneuver had been drilled countless times by the High Seas Fleet.

Before the great battle, Tirpitz had devised a fundamental tactic for the High Seas Fleet: use the battlecruiser squadrons to lure the Grand Fleet into the High Seas Fleet’s ambush. To execute this, the timing of turning away and disengaging was critical for the battlecruiser squadrons.

At this moment, Jellicoe committed his “reserve forces,” the Fourth Battle Squadron, which had not yet engaged.

In fact, the initiative was already in Jellicoe’s hands.

Though Beatty had failed to encircle Rader as hoped and had seen little effect before Hipper’s arrival, Rader’s forces had suffered heavy damage in battle. Even if a few battlecruisers remained combat-capable, they posed little threat and might instead have to contend with Beatty.

Clearly, if Jellicoe wished to avoid battle, he could have withdrawn at any time.

Yet now, Jellicoe felt compelled to fight.

Do not forget, Jellicoe commanded twenty-three battleships, while Hipper had only seventeen. More importantly, Jellicoe had failed to neutralize Rader or sink a single battlecruiser; instead, it was Beatty’s battlecruiser squadron that had been heavily damaged. If he did nothing and withdrew upon meeting Hipper, he would have no explanation to give his superiors upon returning to the Bay of Biscay.

Evidently, Jellicoe had to engage in battle.

Once he confirmed Hipper’s diagonal entry into the battlefield, Jellicoe chose a direct-fire tactic, turning the Grand Fleet’s course to 275 degrees to maintain a 10-degree angle relative to the High Seas Fleet’s heading, gradually closing the distance while adjusting firepower during the slow approach.

One must admit, Jellicoe was a highly capable fleet commander.

Through the preceding hour and a half of exchanges, Jellicoe identified the greatest problem: the British fleet’s main gun accuracy was far inferior to that of the Germans.

Obviously, solving this issue immediately was nearly impossible.

The accuracy of battleship main guns depended on many factors—crew quality, gun manufacturing techniques, aiming methods—and any one of these could decisively impact performance. More importantly, Jellicoe could not pinpoint the root cause at that moment.

All he could do was strive to improve main gun accuracy as much as possible.

He settled on the approach of gradually closing with the High Seas Fleet, allowing gunners to refine their aim through combat experience.

Of course, he could not conceive of a better solution. Charging directly at the High Seas Fleet, even disregarding formation issues, would nullify the numerical advantage in battleships at close range due to the lower hit rate, thus losing the chance of victory.

But was long-range combat necessarily advantageous for the Grand Fleet?

In fact, the preference for long-range engagement belonged not to Jellicoe but to Hipper.

Before the great battle, the Imperial Navy’s capital ships underwent extensive modernization, with nearly all vessels over ten years old retrofitted. Initially, Tirpitz had adhered to von Chengqian’s principle, choosing larger-caliber main guns to increase firepower. However, upon deeper study, Tirpitz revised the plan, opting for guns with greater length-to-caliber ratios.

Simply put, this enhanced the battleships’ long-range capabilities.

Accordingly, all retrofitted vessels equipped with longer-barreled main guns increased the elevation angle of their guns, thus extending their maximum effective range.

Of course, this approach stemmed from the Imperial Navy’s fundamental tactical doctrine.

Facing numerical inferiority, the Imperial Navy was more sensitive to capital ship losses, so preserving strength was more crucial than for their opponents. To conserve strength, the most effective method was to engage at distance, aiming to defeat the enemy in long-range combat. While this could not guarantee total annihilation, it ensured damaged ships could withdraw from battle in an orderly manner.

Moreover, the Imperial Navy emphasized long-range training during peacetime, particularly in gunnery practice, where every gunner was required to master long-distance firing skills. At that time, the Imperial Navy even treated long-range gunnery accuracy as the foremost criterion for gunner qualification.

For Hipper, maintaining greater engagement distance was the key to victory.

At half past eleven, when the distance closed to around eighteen kilometers, Hipper ordered his fleet to turn and match Jellicoe’s course.

This distance was precisely the ideal engagement range Hipper desired.

Prior to the battle, the Imperial Navy had rigorously tested the performance of its 52-caliber 300mm guns, discovering their armor-piercing ability was optimal at 18,000 meters. Combining this with intelligence on the Royal Navy, the Imperial Navy developed a long-range engagement tactic. After von Chengqian’s return, this tactic was further reinforced to maximize the power of long-barreled guns at extended ranges.

In simple terms, the tactic aimed to strike the British ships’ horizontal armor.

At that time, no navy—including the Imperial Navy—fully appreciated the importance of horizontal protection, mainly because of limited gun range. Engagements occurred at close range, with shells primarily striking the ship’s sides, rarely hitting the deck. Additionally, primitive aiming methods constrained battleship main guns’ long-range combat ability, rendering long-range fighting largely impractical.

It was not until around 1910, with key breakthroughs in gun manufacturing significantly improving performance and range, and advances in aiming devices, that long-range gunnery became feasible. Yet within those few years, hardly anyone recognized its importance.

The Imperial Navy’s advanced understanding owed much to von Chengqian.

Naturally, this was also closely tied to a renowned Imperial company: Carl Zeiss.

Before the Anglo-German split, the Royal Navy had to procure optical equipment from the Empire, and Carl Zeiss was the Empire’s premier optical manufacturer. Before the war, Zeiss binoculars, periscopes, and sights sold worldwide were acknowledged as the finest.

Of course, the best equipment was always reserved for their own use.

Thanks to Carl Zeiss, the Imperial Navy possessed the world’s most advanced aiming devices.

Of course, Krupp and other arms manufacturers also played a vital role. At the time, Krupp controlled the world’s top gun manufacturing technology. Two naval battles had already demonstrated that Krupp’s 52-caliber 300mm guns outperformed the Royal Navy’s Mk5 45-caliber 12-inch guns in every aspect, and even matched the 13.5-inch main guns on the "King George V" class.

In fact, this was a key reason the Imperial Navy hesitated to adopt 350mm or even 380mm guns promptly.

These factors combined gave the Imperial Navy the strongest long-range capability of the era.

For Jellicoe to gain the upper hand in long-range combat was nearly impossible.

In truth, Jellicoe never intended to fight at long range; he aimed to close the engagement gradually and defeat the High Seas Fleet in close-range gunnery.

But would Hipper grant him that chance?

Upon seeing Hipper’s fleet turn again to maintain distance, Jellicoe promptly ordered a turn to continue closing the gap.

Unfortunately, Hipper appeared unwilling to fight at close range and immediately adjusted his heading.

Here the problem arose.

Though Jellicoe enjoyed numerical superiority, he had no advantage in speed. More seriously, Jellicoe made a crucial misjudgment.

He relied on pre-war intelligence—specifically from 1912.

At that time, two "Nassau"-class, two "Rheinland"-class, and four "Helgoland"-class battleships still used triple-expansion reciprocating steam engines with limited sustained high-speed capability, thus constituting the fleet’s weak link in speed-focused fleet engagements.

However, by the outbreak of war, this issue had been resolved, at least partially.

Four "Helgoland"-class battleships had completed necessary modernization, replacing boilers with oil-fired ones and installing steam turbines. Although the war interrupted some refits, the fundamental problem of sustained high-speed capability was addressed.

The real weak links were only the two "Nassau"-class and two "Rheinland"-class battleships.

These four were preparing for modernization at the war’s outbreak but halted work to prioritize fleet expansion.

Still, this was not a fatal flaw for the High Seas Fleet.

In battle formation, Hipper placed the Fourth Battle Squadron—composed of the two "Nassau"-class and two "Rheinland"-class ships—at the rear and authorized squadron commanders to withdraw independently if necessary, provided they did not interfere with the main battle.

The question then remained: with four battleships missing, how much chance did Hipper truly have? (To be continued)