Chapter 105: An Uncertain Future

What kind of warship exactly is the Bayern-class?

When discussing the Bayern-class, one must first mention a crucial initiative: the Imperial Strategic Reserve Mechanism, initiated by Feng Chengqian and ultimately approved by the German Emperor.

Before the establishment of this strategic reserve system, all main battleships and most cruisers of the Imperial Navy utilized coal-fired boilers. The main reason was that the empire suffered a severe oil shortage, although coal was abundant. The problem, however, was that coal-fired boilers were far less efficient than oil-fired ones. Theoretically, with the same proportion of displacement dedicated to the power plant, oil-fired boilers could boost a warship’s speed by two to four knots.

A difference of two to four knots is precisely the gap between battleships and battlecruisers.

It was for this reason that Feng Chengqian believed the time had come to build “fast battleships.”

Of course, he was not alone in this view.

After a significant breakthrough in oil-fired boiler technology, Fischer, who had long advocated for battlecruisers prioritizing speed as the foremost attribute of capital ships, also realized it was possible to enhance the protection of warships without compromising speed. This would allow for the construction of fast battleships that combined the armor and firepower of battleships with the speed of battlecruisers, perfectly integrating the two types.

Fischer’s inference led to the renowned Queen Elizabeth-class battleships.

At the technological level of that era, the Queen Elizabeth class could indeed be classified as fast battleships. Upon entering service, these ships were assigned not to battleship squadrons but to battlecruiser squadrons, underscoring their primary value in speed.

However, in pursuit of speed, the Queen Elizabeth class sacrificed other attributes. For instance, the maximum thickness of their main armor belt was only 330 millimeters, which was middling to below average compared to contemporary battleships, especially when measured against the traditionally protection-focused Imperial battleships. Moreover, to keep displacement under control, the Queen Elizabeth class had many structural compromises.

By contrast, these issues were addressed during the design phase of the Bayern-class.

Although oil-fired boilers and steam turbines provided more powerful propulsion, Feng Chengqian was well aware that the power systems were not yet advanced enough for designers to waste displacement recklessly. The ship’s intended tactical role had to be clear from the outset, so that trade-offs among various attributes could be made to design a battleship best suited to the navy’s tactical missions.

From the start, Feng Chengqian explicitly stated that the Bayern-class should not prioritize speed.

To put it plainly: after ensuring firepower and armor protection, then strive to increase speed. Because the Bayern-class was not a speed-specialized battlecruiser but a battleship intended for decisive fleet engagements, firepower and protection were more important than speed.

Unfortunately, Feng Chengqian’s proposal was not implemented by Tirpitz.

This is understandable. During Tirpitz’s tenure as the Imperial Navy’s Secretary of State for War, battlecruisers dominated naval thinking, and speed became the primary criterion for capital ships.

As a result, the Bayern-class design speed was raised to 26 knots at the start of the design process.

Obviously, this adjustment was targeted.

By that time, construction of the Queen Elizabeth class had begun, and the Imperial Navy had intelligence that the design maximum speed of the Queen Elizabeth-class was 25 knots — only two knots slower than contemporary battlecruisers — and the ships were equipped with eight 15-inch guns, not the ten 14-inch guns officially claimed by the Royal Navy. Clearly, the Bayern-class was intended to counter the Queen Elizabeth class, and the Imperial Navy modeled its performance requirements accordingly.

But was this necessary?

Fundamentally, the design philosophies of the Queen Elizabeth and Bayern classes were different. The former was conceived as an enhanced battlecruiser — at least in Fischer’s view — designed to maximize armor protection while maintaining speed and firepower. The Bayern class, however, was an enhanced battleship, aiming to guarantee firepower and protection first, then increase speed.

This essential difference made copying the opponent’s performance parameters unnecessary.

Certainly, a design speed of 26 knots would severely impact other ship attributes.

Tirpitz soon realized this. To achieve 26 knots while keeping displacement under 28,000 tons and maintaining eight main guns, the Bayern-class armor would be weaker than the Queen Elizabeth class — for example, a maximum main belt thickness of only 310 millimeters, less than 300 millimeters for armored bulkheads, and key areas such as turrets, barbettes, and the conning tower capped at 350 millimeters.

Such protection was clearly inadequate.

Consequently, Tirpitz rejected the initial design, causing a delay of several months.

The second design iteration shifted focus to firepower and protection — more precisely, securing a basic firepower layout first, then prioritizing armor, and speed last. Following this approach, the Bayern-class was equipped with four twin 380mm gun turrets, matching the Queen Elizabeth class; the maximum thickness of the main armor belt was increased to 330 millimeters, utilizing the most advanced surface-carburized armor steel, yielding approximately 20% better protection than the Queen Elizabeth class. More importantly, the main armor belt extended from the fore ‘A’ turret to the aft ‘Z’ turret, covering 60% of the ship’s length. Armor bulkheads thickened to 310 millimeters, and critical areas such as turrets, barbettes, and the conning tower reached up to 350 millimeters. Remarkably, the Bayern class was also the first battleship designed with horizontal protection in mind, with 160 millimeters of horizontal armor.

In terms of armor protection, the Bayern class was unquestionably among the best contemporarily.

Not only compared to British battleships, but even American battleships, which also emphasized protection, did not match the Bayern’s lavish armor scheme.

Because of the focus on protection, the Bayern-class design speed settled at 23 knots.

Of course, that was the designed speed.

Although the delay caused serious setbacks in the construction schedule, it brought benefits: more advanced equipment could be installed. Before construction officially began, the empire had developed more efficient oil-fired boilers and more powerful steam turbines. As a result, the Bayern-class propulsion system’s output increased from the designed 56,000 shaft horsepower to 72,000 shaft horsepower, boosting the maximum speed to 25 knots, with engineers confident it could reach 26 knots.

In short, as long as the Bayern-class was completed smoothly, it would outperform the Queen Elizabeth class in all aspects.

The crucial question was whether such a highly anticipated battleship could be completed in time to participate in the most decisive battles.

Feng Chengqian was not optimistic.

Although, in his known history, the decisive naval engagement between Britain and Germany occurred in 1916, history had changed: the Imperial Navy achieved two major victories as early as 1914, breaking the Royal Navy’s monopoly and creating a more advantageous battlefield.

Feng estimated that the final fleet engagement between the British and German navies would take place no later than the second half of 1915.

By then, all four planned Queen Elizabeth-class ships would be completed, with a fifth under construction expected to finish in early 1916. Additionally, the Revenge-class battleships, simplified versions of the Queen Elizabeth class using coal-fired boilers instead of oil-fired ones to reduce power and cost, were also planned to enter service in 1915.

In other words, by late 1915, the Royal Navy would regain its numerical superiority.

Delaying further would obviously be disadvantageous for the Royal Navy.

It should be noted that the three Bayern-class ships already under construction were expected to enter service by the end of 1915, with three more to follow by the end of 1916. If naval budgets were not severely cut, the Imperial Navy planned to start building a new generation of battleships in early 1915, with the lead ship completed by late 1917. The Derfflinger-class battlecruisers would all be in service by 1916, and a new class of battlecruisers was scheduled to begin construction in 1915 and finish by late 1917.

Thus, by 1916, the Royal Navy’s advantage would be significantly diminished.

Consequently, the Royal Navy would likely choose to engage in a decisive battle in 1915 rather than delay until 1916.

But would the Imperial Navy benefit from a 1915 engagement?

Even by late 1915, with the Bayern and Baden commissioned, and assuming no losses of capital ships in battle, the Imperial Navy would have only nineteen battleships and at most eleven battlecruisers, totaling thirty capital ships. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy would field twenty-seven battleships and five battlecruisers, totaling thirty-two ships.

At first glance, the difference did not seem substantial.

The key issue was that the Imperial Navy had too many battlecruisers and too few battleships.

Experience had shown that battlecruisers were ill-suited for decisive fleet engagements. For example, in the early stages of the Battle of Dogger Bank, six of Admiral Beatty’s battlecruisers sustained heavy damage. In fleet battles, speed is not the primary factor because, at speeds above twenty knots, the accuracy of main guns drastically falls. Ideally, a battleship’s speed should be kept below sixteen knots to ensure high main battery hit rates. Under these conditions, the speed advantage of battlecruisers becomes meaningless.

Clearly, Feng Chengqian needed to devise an appropriate countermeasure. (To be continued)