Chapter 133: A Matter of Life and Death

Russia’s defeat pushed Britain and France into a desperate situation.

On November 30, the British House of Commons unanimously passed a compulsory conscription bill submitted by Prime Minister Bonar Law, requiring all eligible British citizens to serve in the military. The following day, with an overwhelming majority, the House passed the wartime naval warship construction plan, increasing the 1916 naval budget from the originally scheduled 1.2 billion pounds to 2.4 billion pounds, with orders for ten new capital ships. In December, the House also passed a resolution requiring all dominions to assist the mother country with all their might.

It could be said that only at this point did Britain truly enter a state of war.

The problem was that starting mobilization now was simply too late. If nothing else, even with the addition of ten capital ships in 1916, they would not be completed and commissioned until late 1918 or even 1919, missing the most critical period entirely.

Like Britain, France also passed several war-related bills in November and December. However, France faced the same issue: any measures taken at the end of 1915 would be difficult to yield results within a few months.

There were already sufficient signs that the coming months would decide the outcome of the European war. If nothing else, the German Empire would certainly not give Britain and France much time and would surely launch a massive strategic offensive in the first half of 1916. More importantly, after receiving reinforcements from the Eastern Front, the German army would gain a significant force advantage on the Western Front. If the Allied forces of Britain and France could not hold off the Germans in the first half of 1916, France would surely be defeated that year.

If France fell, would Britain still be able to fight on?

If the German Empire possessed only a powerful army, Britain would have no need to worry, as the English Channel would be enough to block any land-based enemy. The problem was that the current German Empire possessed not only the strongest army in Europe—and arguably the world—but also a navy second only to Britain’s. With the support of this powerful navy, the narrow English Channel would no longer be an insurmountable chasm.

Arguably, if France were defeated in 1916, Britain could hold out for at most another year. Conversely, even if France were eventually defeated, as long as it could hold on until 1917, or preferably 1918, until Britain’s war policies began to take effect, Britain could at least ensure victory on the naval battlefield, thereby avoiding defeat by the German Empire.

Thus, 1916 was the most critical year.

The problem remained that Britain and France, along with the British dominions, could not possibly defeat the powerful German Empire on their own. To this end, they needed to win over more allies, especially powerful nations. This time, it was not just Britain that was desperate, but France as well.

In December, France formally made a commitment to Italy: if Italy joined the Allied powers, in addition to returning territories occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire to Italy after the war, France would cede disputed areas along the Franco-Italian border and recognize Italy’s dominance in the Mediterranean. Immediately thereafter, Britain also clearly stated that it would recognize Italy’s hegemony in the Mediterranean.

The issue was that Italian leaders were no fools. When Britain and France made these offers, the German Empire was at its zenith, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire had also emerged from the shadows of its early war failures. To the Italian authorities, the promises of Britain and France were nothing more than castles in the air. Simply put, if the Allies lost the war, the promises of Britain and France would be worthless. Moreover, if Italy joined the Axis powers, even if it could not obtain the regions controlled by Austria-Hungary, it could at least gain the territories disputed with France, achieve Mediterranean hegemony, and perhaps even drive Britain out of the Mediterranean entirely.

Precisely because of this, after Britain and France offered new terms, Italy changed its tune. In its response to France, Italy explicitly mentioned that France would not only have to make concessions in territory but also dismantle its Mediterranean fleet after the war and transfer two-thirds of its colonies in the Far East, Africa, and South America to Italy during the war before Italy would even consider joining. In its response to Britain, Italy stated directly that for Britain to recognize Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean, it would have to hand over the Gibraltar fortress, the island of Malta, the port of Alexandria, and the Suez Canal for Italian administration; otherwise, any promises made by Britain would be meaningless.

Interestingly, while making exorbitant demands, Italy lowered its own obligations. At the time, Italy only promised to deploy troops in the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea, refusing to participate in the Western Front or in any other operations involving British and French forces. To put it bluntly, Italy would open a separate front south of the Alps.

For Britain and France, Italy’s demands were clearly too high, the price to pay was too steep, and the significance of Italy’s entry into the war was not sufficiently clear. In fact, at this time, Italy was more inclined to join the Axis camp. During contacts with Britain and France, Italian envoys had already reached Berlin, offering the German Empire that if the Germans recognized Italian hegemony in the Mediterranean, allowed Italy to control southern France after the war, and pressured Austria-Hungary to make appropriate concessions in the Balkans—such as letting Italy control the Croatian region—Italy would immediately join the war as an Axis member.

The first two points were simple, as the German Empire had previously made similar promises. The key lay in the third point: the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not necessarily willing to make concessions in the Balkans. It must be known that even during the difficult times a year ago, Austria-Hungary had not agreed to let Italy meddle in the Balkans. Now that the Axis powers had achieved major strategic victories, Austria-Hungary was even less likely to allow Italy to control the Croatian region, and the German Empire clearly could not make decisions on behalf of Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, there were problems with Italy’s first demand; one must not forget that Austria-Hungary was also a Mediterranean coastal nation, and the Ottoman Empire lay to the east of the Mediterranean. If Italy’s request were granted, the German Empire would certainly offend two of its existing allies, meaning Italy’s entry might not necessarily have a positive impact.

While Italy remained indecisive, Britain and France turned their attention to countries far from the battlefield.

There is no need to elaborate on the United States; Bonar Law was already preparing to travel to Washington at the end of December to directly request President Wilson to join the war. At the time, British authorities believed there was a very high probability of American intervention.

Consequently, the nation that truly required effort to handle was Japan in the Far East. If Japan were willing to join the war, Britain and France would gain a powerful source of support. The problem was that to get Japan to join at this stage, a much higher price had to be paid.

On December 10, Britain was the first to state its position: as long as Japan joined the war, Britain would hand over all its interests in China, as well as all of the German Empire’s interests in China, to Japan, and would also cede colonies in the Western Pacific, such as Singapore, to Japan, acknowledging Japan’s status as the hegemon of the Western Pacific.

In fact, this already exceeded the demands Japan had initially made. More importantly, this was equivalent to Britain withdrawing from the Western Pacific and retreating to the Indian Ocean.

Regrettably, Japan was not satisfied and explicitly demanded that after Britain withdrew from the Western Pacific, it must also share India with Japan. Although Japan did not explicitly ask for colonies in India, it clearly stated that Japanese enterprises and goods must enjoy the same treatment as British ones in India. In other words, Britain had to fully open the Indian market and grant Japan most-favored-nation status.

At that time, Britain almost accepted Japan’s demands. However, before the British authorities could respond, Japan suddenly changed its stance, demanding not only the opening of the Indian market but also access to India’s resource-producing regions—meaning Japan would enjoy the same rights to acquire resources in India as Britain. Otherwise, Japan would not join the war as an Allied member.

Could Britain accept such demands? The answer was clearly no. If Britain agreed to Japan’s demands, it would be tantamount to handing India over to Japan, losing its most valuable colony.

At this time, France was also actively courting Japan. To induce Japan to join the war and send troops to participate in the European conflict, France offered to transfer colonies such as Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia to Japan, while recognizing Japan’s interests in China.

The problem was that France’s position did not play a decisive role. The dilemma facing Britain was that to get Japan to join the war, it would have to abandon the Western Pacific and perhaps even the Indian Ocean, discarding the Asia-Pacific colonial system it had spent over a century building.

Of course, while making these demands, Japan also offered conditions that were tempting to Britain. Japan would not only dispatch a fleet to the Mediterranean and North Atlantic to assist the Royal Navy but would also send an army of no fewer than 500,000 soldiers to fight in Europe. This was precisely why France was so proactive.

However, at the end of 1915, any effort made by Britain and France regarding Japan was unlikely to yield results, because within Britain, almost everyone believed that sacrificing all colonial and overseas markets in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean just to secure the Japanese navy was far too costly. Thus, even if Bonar Law were prepared to make the sacrifice, members of Parliament and the public would not agree.

Unable to timely bring Japan into the war, Britain had no choice but to pin its hopes on the United States.

In a sense, one United States was worth ten Japans. One must not forget that Japan was merely an upstart in the Western Pacific, while the United States was already a bonafide industrial powerhouse whose production capacity had surpassed that of the German Empire. More importantly, the United States had a larger population and richer natural resources.

As long as the United States was willing to join the war, France could survive the life-or-death test of 1916.