Chapter 113: A Most Fortunate Situation

February 2, 1915, marked the end of Asquith’s political career.

In the early hours of that day, German forces on the Western Front, under the unified command of Falkenhayn, launched the "Battle of Neuve Chapelle," targeting French positions in the Artois region. The German offensive was both sudden and perfectly timed.

At the time, the Anglo-French coalition was actively planning their own offensive, intending to make a significant push in the Artois region, with a start date set for February 5. Consequently, when the Germans launched their attack, the French forces in the area were fully prepared for their own assault; large numbers of troops were massed near the front lines, and combat supplies had already been delivered. Within four hours of the German attack, the gathered French troops and stockpiled supplies were decimated by heavy German artillery. In just a few hours, the German army broke through two defensive lines and routed the French.

Upon receiving the news, Asquith had no choice. That morning, he submitted his resignation to the House of Commons, announcing the dissolution of his cabinet, and was subsequently replaced by a provisional coalition government formed by Bonar Law.

Asquith’s downfall was perhaps not a bad thing. It could be said that he was not a qualified wartime leader; his overly weak character made it difficult for him to lead the nation during a time of war. Among other things, by the time of his resignation, Asquith had still failed to implement a system of conscription.

The rise of Bonar Law did not save the Anglo-French forces on the Western Front. By February 7, the German offensive reached its zenith; nearly 400,000 French troops in the Artois region were wiped out, and two French armies were virtually annihilated. Although Falkenhayn advocated for continued aggression to further expand their gains, the German General Staff firmly opposed this, and the Kaiser intervened directly, ordering Falkenhayn to cease offensive operations once the established objectives were met and to transition the Western Front into a defensive posture.

The Kaiser’s intervention was timely. Although the German army still held a clear advantage on the battlefield, after six consecutive days of fighting, they were nearing the limit of their endurance. More importantly, to rescue the collapsing French forces, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had already assembled in the Ypres sector. If the German army continued to push forward, it would be unable to cope with the challenge posed by the BEF. Clearly, knowing when to stop was the only way to secure the gains already made.

Three days later, the Kaiser's judgment was vindicated. On February 10, the British Expeditionary Force launched a preemptive strike in the Ypres sector, signaling the start of the Second Battle of Ypres. For the first two days, the British held a significant advantage, advancing nearly twenty kilometers and breaking through two German defensive lines. However, by the third day, as German reserves arrived, the British advance was contained, and the situation on the battlefield shifted 180 degrees. On February 13, the German army launched a counterattack in the Ypres sector.

It must be admitted that Falkenhayn, as Chief of the German General Staff, was no mediocrity. When planning the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, he had anticipated that the British Expeditionary Force would likely launch an offensive in the Ypres sector, where German defenses were relatively weak. To this end, Falkenhayn had originally intended to plan two offensives—one in Artois and one in Ypres—to shatter the counter-offensive intentions of the Anglo-French coalition. However, during the implementation phase, due to a lack of expected reinforcements, he staggered the two operations and chose to attack the French in Artois first, leaving the German forces in the Ypres sector in a defensive posture.

Of course, this is not to say Falkenhayn’s deployment was without flaws. To achieve a major victory in Artois, he had diverted many troops from other parts of the Western Front, weakening the already thin defense of Ypres. When the British launched their offensive, there were only twelve German divisions holding a front stretching over tens of kilometers.

By the first day, the British had already committed thirty-four divisions. Had it not been for the terrain, the British would likely have achieved a major breakthrough before the German reserves arrived, and the outcome of the Second Battle of Ypres would have been vastly different. At this juncture, the significance of terminating the Battle of Neuve Chapelle became apparent. On February 13, two-thirds of the German troops involved in the counterattack at Ypres had been drawn from the Artois region—the very units that had fought at Neuve Chapelle. It was their timely arrival that halted the British offensive and routed them in one blow. In terms of timing, had the reserves arrived one day later, the German army would have suffered a crushing defeat at Ypres.

By February 17, the main phase of the Second Battle of Ypres concluded. After launching their counterattack, the Germans not only recovered lost positions but also pushed the front line forward by nearly five kilometers. After suffering nearly 300,000 casualties, the British finally realized that it was impossible to defeat the German army there and shifted their troops to a defensive stance. Having fought two consecutive battles, the German army was also stretched thin and forced to halt its offensive. Naturally, small-scale skirmishes did not cease. Over the next month, both German and British forces launched several minor operations to straighten the jagged front lines and secure more favorable tactical positions.

On February 18, Feng Chengqian received a telegram from Hipper. Although far away in the North Atlantic, Feng could clearly grasp the situation on the ground through Hipper’s report. The outcome of the battles of Neuve Chapelle and the Second Battle of Ypres signaled the bankruptcy of the Anglo-French strategic counter-offensive plan. These two battles, which resulted in over 700,000 casualties and prisoners for the Allies, were enough to prove that in the short term, the Anglo-French coalition could not seize the initiative; the German army remained the masters of the Western Front. Yet, after these two engagements, it was equally impossible for Falkenhayn to organize a new large-scale offensive in the short term. Clearly, the Western Front had once again fallen into a stalemate.

In contrast to the Western Front, the German advantage on the Eastern Front was overwhelming. By February 10, Ludendorff had cleared the Russian forces from Poland, pushing the front line forward by 100 to 200 kilometers—effectively extending the empire’s home defense perimeter by that same distance. From then on, the Russian army could no longer pose a direct threat to the imperial heartland. By February 20, the Austro-Hungarian forces, supported by the Germans, had recovered most of Silesia. According to Ludendorff’s reports, in nearly two months of fighting, the German and Austrian forces had annihilated nearly two million Russian troops, while sustaining fewer than 300,000 casualties. It could be said that Ludendorff had fulfilled his promise ahead of schedule.

Although Russia had not yet gone into shock from excessive losses, by the end of February, the Russian war machine had collapsed, rendered incapable of contesting the strategic initiative against the German army. At the end of February, when Ludendorff returned to Berlin to report, he suggested to the Kaiser that if he were given another forty divisions, he could defeat Russia within six months. Clearly, Ludendorff was getting a bit carried away.

Fortunately, the Kaiser was not blinded by victory. While he agreed to provide Ludendorff with twenty additional divisions, he did not demand that Russia be defeated within six months; instead, he instructed him to focus on Romania and Bulgaria, aiming to bring them into the war within the year. Put simply, the Kaiser was more interested in securing the resources of Romania and Bulgaria.

Russia’s three consecutive defeats at the hands of the Germans—losing not only Poland but also most of Silesia—had a profound impact on Romania and Bulgaria, both of which were still observing from the sidelines. Relatively speaking, Romania was more deeply affected. At the time, the Empire had already reached a basic agreement with Bulgaria regarding their participation in the war. According to the terms, as long as Bulgaria joined the war as a member of the Axis, it would receive a portion of Serbian territory and be granted security guarantees by the Empire. The Bulgarian authorities were extremely satisfied with this, though the Empire’s efforts to court Romania had caused some hesitation. With the third major German victory on the Eastern Front and the assistance provided to the Austrian forces, the Bulgarian authorities would surely settle their stance soon. If all went well, Bulgaria would join the war on the side of the Axis within two to three months.

The key, however, remained Romania. For the Empire, Romania was of immense significance; this nation, located on the lower Danube, possessed not only the largest oil fields on the European continent but also fertile land. To the Empire, Romanian oil and grain were primary strategic resources that could be accessed nearby. Furthermore, Romania's geographical position was critical. If Romania joined the Axis, the Empire could achieve a three-sided encirclement of Russia, effectively extending the Russian defensive line by nearly 1,000 kilometers. For the already crumbling Russian army, an additional 1,000 kilometers of front meant creating even more defensive gaps. It is fair to say that once Romania embraced the Axis, Russia would be close to defeat.

However, negotiations with Romania had not gone smoothly. At least until Ludendorff’s sweep through Poland and Silesia, Romania had still leaned toward the Allied camp, primarily because the Empire had courted Bulgaria first and maintained close ties with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Addressing this, Ludendorff had already drawn up a specific operational plan targeting Romania. If Romania refused to align, Ludendorff intended to deploy two armies, planning to sweep through the entire country within three months. Of course, that plan remained locked in the archives. For the Empire, winning Romania over was far more advantageous than conquering it.

By the end of February, the Russian authorities realized that if Britain and France took no action, Russia would have to bear the full weight of the German onslaught, making defeat inevitable. For this reason, in late February, the Tsar sent three consecutive urgent requests to Britain and France, demanding that they take substantial offensive action on the Western Front as soon as possible. Unfortunately, Britain and France were simply unable to meet the Tsar’s demands.

It could be said that by the end of February 1915, following the German Empire's adjustment of its overall strategic policy, the German army entered its most favorable position on the European continent since the Battle of the Marne. Victory seemed to be within reach, and many even believed it could be achieved within the year. Clearly, that was being far too optimistic.