Chapter 136: A Circuitous Approach to Salvation

Leasing active-duty warships to Great Britain was by no means a simple matter. Even with the active support of American industrial, financial, and commercial sectors, and the efforts of certain influential politicians, securing Congressional approval required a Herculean effort.

The crux of the issue was that these warships were still active components of the U.S. Navy.

Although the U.S. Congress had passed a neutrality-related act shortly after the outbreak of the war—which allowed for the export of armaments, including warships, to any belligerent nation provided they paid in cash—this legislation did not cover the leasing of active-duty U.S. military equipment to nations at war. The core problem lay in the fact that leasing active equipment to a belligerent power would unequivocally violate the principle of neutrality.

So, how could this be circumvented?

In early February, the U.S. Navy submitted a revised shipbuilding plan to Congress, proposing the addition of twelve capital ships over the five years following 1916. The primary justification for this plan was that the British Royal Navy was set to receive five *Queen Elizabeth*-class and five *Revenge*-class battleships, along with two *Renown*-class battlecruisers, while the U.S. Navy lacked equivalent capital ships.

Clearly, the U.S. Navy was treating the members of Congress like fools.

For a long time, the U.S. Navy had ranked among the top three in the world. Before 1910, its strength had even surpassed that of the Imperial German Navy, trailing only the British Royal Navy. By the time the Great War broke out, the U.S. Navy already possessed two *South Carolina*-class, two *Delaware*-class, two *Florida*-class, two *Wyoming*-class, two *New York*-class, and two *Nevada*-class battleships. Additionally, two *Pennsylvania*-class ships were under construction, and in 1915, the construction of three *New Mexico*-class battleships had been authorized. In other words, by this time, the U.S. Navy already possessed twelve active battleships and five under construction; its overall scale was not inferior to the Imperial German Navy, nor was it significantly behind the battered British Royal Navy.

It was evident that Congress had already provided the Navy with funding corresponding to the new ships the Royal Navy had acquired during the war. The *New Mexico* class had been designed specifically to counter the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Bayern* classes. Equipped with twelve 14-inch main guns, these battleships surpassed the *Queen Elizabeth* class in firepower and the *Bayern* class in protection, falling slightly behind only in speed. They were undoubtedly among the most advanced and powerful battleships in the world at the time.

Of course, these ships were not perfect. Strictly speaking, the *New Mexico* class was the last of the first generation of "Standard-type" battleships for the U.S. Navy. Their hull structures were not significantly different from the *Nevada* class; they were merely enlarged to accommodate more main guns, leaving little room for improvement in basic performance. Naturally, this was precisely what the U.S. Navy found unsatisfactory. What they desired was a battleship capable of overpowering both the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Bayern* classes in every performance metric—a design that was entirely new. Unfortunately, Congress did not provide funding for such a vessel in 1915.

The problem was that, in the eyes of Congress, there was no urgent need to build new battleships. To put it bluntly, they believed the U.S. Navy was already sufficiently powerful and that continuing to build new types would only waste precious fiscal budget for no reason. Consequently, the Navy's proposal was rejected.

However, not long after, an event shifted the perspective of the congressmen: the British Royal Navy announced it would build a new type of battleship, codenamed "N3," whose firepower, protection, and speed would comprehensively surpass the Imperial German Navy’s *Bayern* class. This finally made Congress sit up and take notice.

Although the "N3"-type battleship was aimed primarily at the *Bayern* class and other new designs from Germany, and the likelihood of a war between the United States and Britain was low, the U.S. needed a military capable of upholding its neutrality. For the United States, the Navy was undoubtedly more important than the Army. There were no longer any nations on the North American continent capable of posing a threat to the U.S.; the true enemies that could threaten America came from the sea. If Britain initiated the construction of the "N3" class, the German Empire would certainly follow suit, and thus, the United States required a new class of battleship as well.

In late February, Congress passed the proposal for the *Tennessee*-class battleships. Another factor contributing to this decision was the German strategic offensive on the Western Front, which had begun in late February. Unlike Falkenhayn, Ludendorff focused on the "hinge" of the Western Front—the Verdun region, near the German border. He had clearly identified the strategic objective: if the Verdun fortress were captured, the German army could strike directly toward Paris. Within three days, the Germans had occupied most of the Verdun region and annihilated nearly 400,000 French troops.

The Western Front, which had been relatively quiet for over half a year, exploded back into activity. If the Germans advanced any further and captured the entire Verdun region, France would lose the gateway to Paris, and its defeat within months would be unsurprising. For this reason, the French fought with desperate ferocity. Verdun became a meat grinder; tens of thousands of French officers and soldiers were driven into the fray, only to be pulverized by German artillery.

The shifting situation in Europe made the U.S. Congress realize the importance of strengthening military preparedness. Interestingly, this time it was not the U.S. Navy that was anxious, but Congress. Initially, the Navy hoped to design a new battleship that would balance all major performance metrics and surpass all competitors. However, when it came to funding, Congress explicitly demanded that the *Tennessee* class begin construction no later than the end of 1916. This left insufficient time for a completely new design, forcing the Navy to improve upon the *New Mexico* class. In fact, even for improvements, time was tight. Ultimately, Congress made a concession, pushing the construction date of the *Tennessee* class to June 1917, provided it was not later than the British "N3" class.

Even so, it remained impossible to design a truly new battleship. The result was that the *Tennessee* class heavily utilized the mature designs and technology of the *New Mexico* class. They merely optimized the hull structure and enhanced armor protection, while main gun firepower and speed remained largely unchanged—still insufficient to contend with the "N3" class. It should be noted that the Royal Navy planned to equip the "N3" class with nine 18-inch guns, a main armor belt exceeding 380mm in thickness, and a top speed of over 24 knots—all three indicators significantly stronger than those of the *Tennessee* class.

Including the two *Tennessee*-class ships, the U.S. Navy's capital ship total had reached nineteen. A new problem arose: unless the naval budget was significantly increased, continuing to build new ships would only exacerbate the Navy’s maintenance burden, leaving no funds for further capital ship construction. In other words, unless a batch of existing capital ships was disposed of, new ones could not be built. This also related to infrastructure; at the time, U.S. naval bases in the Atlantic could support a maximum of twenty capital ships. Expanding infrastructure to accommodate more would be another significant expense.

It was against this backdrop that the U.S. Navy proposed the retirement of several older capital ships. At this point, the true objective of the Navy’s series of maneuvers became clear: selling or leasing retired warships to Great Britain would not violate the neutrality principle.

In early March, the U.S. Navy formally submitted the design for the *Colorado*-class battleship to Congress. This class was equipped with eight 16-inch guns, and its main armor belt was nearly 350mm thick—a marked improvement over the *Tennessee* class. Although the *Colorado* class still lacked exceptional speed, its displacement and cost were far lower than the "N3" class. According to Navy estimates, the cost of a *Colorado*-class ship was only half that of an "N3."

Congress did not oppose the *Colorado* class, but hoped to delay it until 1918. The Navy argued that waiting until 1918 would be too late, as the "N3" class would certainly be launched before then. Eventually, Congress agreed to fund two *Colorado*-class ships in 1917, but required the Navy to scrap at least one battleship beforehand to keep the number of capital ships within twenty and reduce maintenance costs.

With Congress making concessions, the U.S. Navy immediately proposed a new solution: scrap even more battleships, sell them to countries in urgent need, and use the proceeds to fund the construction of more new ships. The Navy then proposed retiring eight battleships armed with 12-inch guns—two *South Carolina*, two *Delaware*, two *Florida*, and two *Wyoming* class—and selling them to the Royal Navy. The proceeds would fund the order for two additional *Colorado*-class ships and initiate the design and construction of the *South Dakota* class.

Initially, Congress was adamantly opposed, as this meant the U.S. Navy’s capital ship strength would fall below ten in the short term. It was only when the Navy argued that the proceeds from the sale of the eight old battleships—combined with the next three years of naval budgets—would not only allow for two extra *Colorado*-class ships but also for the construction of six *South Dakota*-class ships, bringing the total to over twenty by 1920, that Congress relented. They approved the disposal of the eight old battleships and authorized the design budget for the *South Dakota* class.

With this, the United States had taken the most critical step toward selling warships to Great Britain.