Chapter Ninety-Nine: Sacrifice

Betty turned to retreat, and Raeder no longer hesitated, immediately accelerating in pursuit.

At this moment, the situation on the battlefield was extremely unfavorable for Betty, for the Lion had taken two hits from 300 mm armor-piercing shells during the engagement—one striking the bow, crippling her speed so that she could not exceed twenty-four knots. Raeder, on the other hand, was pursuing at over twenty-six knots, more than two knots faster.

Clearly, without support from Jellicoe, Betty had no chance of escape.

Herein lay the problem: if Jellicoe moved to support Betty, he would inevitably run into Hipper.

Soon, the situation became even more disadvantageous for Jellicoe.

Shortly before nine o’clock, a light cruiser dispatched by Raeder spotted Jellicoe’s fleet advancing from the north. Though the cruiser was quickly subjected to a merciless barrage and was ultimately sunk by two 343 mm armor-piercing shells from Iron Duke and Marlborough, it managed to send a wireless report before going down, accurately relaying the sighting.

Jellicoe had arrived, and the outcome was now all but certain.

As he reorganized his formation, Hipper sent Raeder an order: do not pursue too aggressively; be ready to withdraw upon encountering Jellicoe’s main fleet; there was no need to risk a decisive battle with Jellicoe before the High Seas Fleet’s main body arrived.

Raeder understood as well that, if it came to a fight, he was no match for Jellicoe.

He had only one advantage: speed. To put it bluntly, with the advantage of speed, the initiative to fight or not was in Raeder’s hands.

Yet, there was still one thing Raeder had to do: he needed to force Betty out of the fight.

Here, the tactical issue of battlecruisers became crucial.

Thanks to Fisher’s vigorous advocacy, battlecruisers had seen great development over the past decade. Both Britain and the German Empire had built large numbers, and other powers had followed suit. Yet regarding their use—that is, tactically—no nation had established a firm doctrine. The only credible tactic at the time was to make full use of the battlecruisers’ superior speed.

From this arose a problem: in battle, the primary adversary of a battlecruiser was another battlecruiser.

The reason was simple: only a battlecruiser could both catch and destroy another battlecruiser—battleships lacked the speed, armored cruisers lacked the firepower, and thus neither could play the role of battlecruiser hunter.

Thus, in a fleet action, the first task for battlecruisers was to neutralize the enemy’s battlecruisers.

Although Betty had only three battlecruisers remaining—and Lion was badly damaged, unable to make even twenty-four knots—if used wisely, these three could still pose a grave threat to Raeder, for example by acting as blockers should Raeder be forced to retreat.

For this reason, Raeder had to eliminate Betty, or at least drive him from the field.

To this end, Raeder pressed ahead at full speed.

The problem was, he had already reached his maximum speed. Even if he pushed the boilers and turbines beyond their limits and squeezed out a little more, it was unsustainable for long.

What was worse, Hipper could not make even twenty knots.

Had Raeder properly understood Hipper’s order, he should have reduced speed to at least twenty-four knots to keep within supporting distance of Hipper. While this would forfeit the chance to annihilate Betty, it would secure solid support from Hipper. From another angle, even if Betty was not forced out, with Hipper’s arrival the High Seas Fleet would possess a clear advantage.

Evidently, Raeder misunderstood Hipper’s order.

He believed Hipper wanted him to face Jellicoe alone, or at least occupy Jellicoe’s attention.

At that time, Raeder’s misjudgment was understandable. The Spee squadron was about to arrive, and the High Seas Fleet’s primary mission was to escort it home. He assumed Hipper wished him to tie down Jellicoe while Hipper led the main force to cover Spee.

The result of this error was an unpredictable impact on the entire battle.

If, at that moment, Raeder had reduced speed, Jellicoe would not have pressed the attack, knowing Hipper was nearby and that any move against Raeder would bring him up against Hipper as well. The problem was, Raeder did not slow down, but continued to doggedly pursue Betty at top speed.

Jellicoe was left with no choice but to engage.

Tactically, the sooner Jellicoe entered the fight, the greater his advantage, as it afforded him more time to deal with Raeder.

At 9:45, Raeder came within range of Jellicoe’s guns.

By then, Jellicoe’s twenty-three battleships were arranged in four columns. The first, at the head, consisted of four Iron Duke-class ships, along with Ireland and Alcukin, their port sides facing Raeder. The second, composed of four King George V-class and two Orion-class ships, trailed obliquely behind the first, also turning their port sides to Raeder. The third, made up of four Centaur-class and Neptune, followed the second, likewise port toward Raeder. The fourth, with three Bellerophon-class and three St Vincent-class battleships, was to the right of the first column and had yet to join the battle.

In other words, seventeen battleships entered the fray almost immediately.

There was no doubt: Raeder’s position was dire. He commanded only six battlecruisers. Though their main guns had been refitted for higher elevation and thus greater range, facing seventeen battleships offered not the slightest advantage.

Indeed, even against six battleships, Raeder would find no advantage.

The reason was simple: at long range, the 300 mm guns of the Imperial Navy’s battlecruisers could not penetrate battleship armor, and at close range, even if penetration was possible, the battlecruisers themselves would be even more vulnerable to destruction by battleship shells.

All Raeder could do was keep the engagement at maximum possible range.

As long as the distance was great enough, main gun accuracy would remain low, and he could fulfill Hipper’s orders—to tie down Jellicoe.

Yet Raeder overlooked one key point: Betty had not lost combat effectiveness, nor withdrawn from battle.

Within ten minutes, Jellicoe’s main force had hurled hundreds of shells at Raeder’s battlecruiser squadron.

Though none struck directly, it was a harrowing sight—several large-caliber armor-piercing shells splashed down near Derfflinger.

Given the fragile construction of battlecruisers, even a single shell hit would spell disaster for Raeder.

In fact, at this critical juncture, the Royal Navy’s method of fire control proved decisive—in Raeder’s favor, no less.

Before the war, the Imperial Navy had adopted a bracketing method of aiming, training intensively. In the first half of 1914 alone, the Imperial Navy spent three hundred million marks on training—enough to build two battleships. The Royal Navy, by contrast, was conservative and had not reformed its fire-control systems, continuing to use continuous-aim methods, and had not matched the Imperial Navy’s prewar training.

The Battle of Shetland had already shown that bracketing was more reliable.

Imperial Navy statistics from that battle indicated that the High Seas Fleet’s battlecruiser division scored a main gun hit rate of about 2.5 percent. While this was below peacetime standards, it was still far superior to their opponents. Conservative estimates put the Grand Fleet’s battlecruiser division’s hit rate below 1.5 percent in that action. Apart from training, the main reason for the Royal Navy’s low hit rate was their outdated aiming methods.

While Raeder struggled to hold on, Betty was also racing to rejoin the fight.

By this stage, Betty was keenly aware that quickly defeating Raeder would be the key to overcoming the High Seas Fleet. If Raeder was not routed before Hipper’s arrival, even with Jellicoe’s twenty-three battleships against Hipper’s seventeen, victory was far from assured.

Thus, the three remaining battlecruisers under Betty’s command became vitally important.

Because they lacked the speed, Jellicoe’s battleships could not pursue Raeder, nor close the range. Raeder, for his part, strove to maintain distance, seeking only to buy time for Hipper’s arrival. This left only Betty’s three battlecruisers, with their greater speed, able to attempt to close in on Raeder. If Betty could employ proper tactics, he might even force Raeder toward Jellicoe.

The best tactic at the time was to swing ahead of Raeder and seize the most advantageous firing position.

The problem was that applying theory in practice was no simple task.

Though Betty had prepared beforehand, positioning himself ahead of Jellicoe as the latter entered the engagement, thus gaining a positional advantage, Raeder was determined only to delay, keeping his speed around twenty knots and with no intention of a decisive action against Jellicoe. In essence, Betty was only four knots faster than Raeder; to get ahead of him would require hours.

Evidently, Betty could not count on several hours for maneuver.

Not far to the south, Hipper was hurrying at full speed. All Raeder needed to do was survive the next hour and a half without being crippled by Jellicoe.

For a fleet action involving dozens of capital ships, an hour and a half was not long.

But for a squadron of just six battlecruisers facing an enemy four times its strength, that hour and a half would seem endless.

Within that time, Raeder would make grave sacrifices.

(To be continued)