Chapter 104: Strategic Miscalculation

After the outbreak of the great war, Aquist’s position came under serious challenge. At that time, many in British political circles, as well as a large portion of the British public, believed that Aquist was an unfit wartime leader—lacking the capability to steer Britain through this unprecedented conflict. The main criticisms were that Aquist was overly weak and lacked influence within the Conservative Party.

Following the Battle of Shetland, Bonar Law and Lloyd George launched a campaign to topple the government. Although Aquist survived this crisis, doubts about his leadership only intensified. The Battle of Dogger Bank saw the Royal Navy suffer another defeat, losing three capital ships and several other vessels. Even though Churchill had taken the blame by resigning voluntarily, those who wished for Aquist’s resignation were not appeased; figures like Bonar Law and Lloyd George tabled a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons.

In truth, the Dogger Bank battle was merely the fuse that ignited the powder keg.

The most significant doubt cast upon Aquist was his prolonged reluctance to introduce conscription, maintaining a voluntary enlistment system that was ill-suited to the new realities of war. Moreover, his repeated concessions in dealings with France and Russia deeply dissatisfied many politicians. Britain’s involvement in the war was not to aid France and Russia altruistically, but to defend its own interests.

To these politicians, Aquist’s concessions were not protection of British interests but rather a sacrifice of British blood for the benefit of France and Russia.

Though such views were tinged with bias, they resonated strongly with the British public.

More importantly, these perceptions were cited as the cause for the Royal Navy’s repeated defeats.

What Aquist needed most now was a victory—indeed, one could say that it was domestic pressure, especially from ambitious politicians, that persuaded Aquist to heed Churchill’s advice and send the Grand Fleet out in search of a decisive battle.

With Churchill’s resignation, did Aquist still have any way out?

Even if the Royal Navy avoided further defeats, Aquist would likely be forced to resign within two months. Only a decisive victory could keep him in Downing Street.

Of course, it did not necessarily have to be a victory at sea.

On December 24th, Aquist approved a large-scale strategic offensive plan submitted by the Expeditionary Force commander, French, scheduled for early 1915.

Shortly thereafter, Aquist issued a strict order to Jellicoe: the Grand Fleet must be ready for a decisive battle within three months.

Three months—what could be accomplished in that time?

By early 1915, the battlecruiser Tiger, completed in late October 1914, would have finished its training and joined the Royal Navy’s combat fleet. The long-awaited lead ship of the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships was also set to enter service in January 1915, with the second ship, Warspite, following in March. Yet despite these additions, the Royal Navy still lagged behind the German High Seas Fleet in overall strength.

According to intelligence obtained by the Royal Navy, by early 1915 the German Imperial Navy would have the first two battlecruisers of the Derfflinger class—Derfflinger and Lützow—joining the fleet. Including the repaired battleships Moltke and Von der Tann, the High Seas Fleet would possess twenty-seven capital ships, while the Royal Navy could muster at most thirty.

On the surface, Britain still held a numerical advantage.

The problem was that not all thirty capital ships could be assigned to the Grand Fleet. For instance, at least one battlecruiser was required in the Mediterranean. Should Italy side with the Central Powers, the need to reinforce the Channel Fleet would further weaken the Grand Fleet’s strength.

Additionally, the Royal Navy harbored concerns about the Bayern-class battleships, which could rival the Queen Elizabeth-class and were expected to enter service in 1915. Though intelligence suggested that construction of the Bayern class was delayed by the war and might not be completed on schedule, no one could guarantee that the German Empire would not elevate the navy’s priority and accelerate their completion after the battles of Shetland and Dogger Bank.

It must be noted that the Bayern class was the first German battleship armed with 380mm main guns.

While caliber alone did not fully reflect firepower, Germany’s artillery technology was already superior to Britain’s—for example, its 300mm guns were significantly more powerful than British guns of the same caliber. Hence it was reasonable to believe that the Bayern class would outgun the Queen Elizabeth class, which mounted fifteen-inch guns. Moreover, German ships emphasized protection, so in armor the Bayern class would surpass the Queen Elizabeth class, which sacrificed some defense for speed.

What was more alarming was that ample intelligence confirmed the Bayern class utilized more compact oil-fired boilers, meaning their power output was likely much higher than expected, allowing them to match the Queen Elizabeth class in speed.

In short, there was no capital ship in the Royal Navy at that time capable of matching the Bayern class.

At least, that was the consensus among British naval commanders.

For Jellicoe, preparing the fleet within three months to fight and win a decisive battle was as difficult as scaling the heavens—practically impossible.

Of course, this was merely Jellicoe’s view.

On the other side, the situation of the High Seas Fleet was far from ideal.

Although the High Seas Fleet had achieved a more glorious victory at Dogger Bank than at Shetland, with Admiral von Reuter receiving the oak leaves and commendations for Hipper, von Trotha, and the combat-effective officers and men, and even the German Emperor granting the entire fleet a month’s extra pay in celebration, the reality was a costly Pyrrhic victory.

The heaviest losses were suffered by Reuter’s battlecruiser squadron.

Upon returning to Wilhelmshaven, all six battlecruisers were badly damaged. The Augusta Victoria and Wilhelm der Grosse barely made it to dock with the aid of tugboats and repair vessels, then were sent to dry dock for extensive six-month overhauls. The other four ships were in similarly poor condition, preliminarily assessed to require three months for repairs and substantial funding.

Moreover, Hipper’s battleship fleet also took significant damage.

All seventeen battleships were hit and needed repairs in port. The four König-class battleships of the First Battle Squadron sustained the most severe damage—König and Grosser Kurfürst required dry dock work, while the other two had to remain moored for months.

Though Moltke and Von der Tann were nearing repair completion, in the next three months the High Seas Fleet would have only these two battlecruisers available.

As for battleships under construction, von Trotha held no illusions.

Only the Derfflinger and Lützow battlecruisers were progressing at a reasonable pace. If all went well, they would enter service in January and March 1915, respectively. Thanks to the training ship Brummer, crew training could proceed concurrently, allowing these two battlecruisers to rapidly achieve combat readiness upon commissioning.

The real prize von Trotha sought was the Bayern-class battleships.

Although von Trotha had not been involved in the design of the Bayern class—having left the Imperial Navy Department before their approval—the Bayern class was regarded as his final and greatest contribution as Secretary of the Navy. Before his departure, von Trotha had established the main performance specifications for the class.

When Tirpitz succeeded him, he almost unaltered followed von Trotha’s specifications to guide the design work.

In von Trotha’s eyes, the Bayern class was the most powerful battleship of the era.

Regrettably, after von Trotha’s departure, Tirpitz—under external pressures—raised the priority of battlecruiser construction, consequently slowing battleship progress. Had construction proceeded according to von Trotha’s plan, the Bayern class should have begun building by 1912 at the latest, but in reality construction only started in early 1913—nearly a year late. Furthermore, the building pace was much slower than von Trotha expected. When the war broke out, only 80% of the Bayern’s slipway work had been completed.

This was still the result of von Trotha’s repeated urgings.

Upon returning to the Imperial Navy, von Trotha pressed Tirpitz to accelerate Bayern-class construction. Without his insistence, the Bayern might have barely reached 50% completion by the war’s outbreak, making a 1915 launch impossible.

The problem was that after the war began, imperial policies clearly favored the army.

This was understandable, yet the navy’s status was significantly diminished, directly causing the major delays in Bayern-class battleship construction.

To ensure the Bayern was completed on time, the Imperial Navy had to slow the construction of the subsequent three ships.

Even so, the Bayern was unlikely to enter service in early 1915 at best, probably only beginning outfitting then.

In terms of schedule, the Bayern was nearly a year behind von Trotha’s original expectations.

It must be acknowledged that Tirpitz committed a serious strategic error by following Britain’s lead in emphasizing battlecruisers instead of focusing on the more valuable battleships.

Regarding this, von Trotha could only sigh—again and again.

Had the Bayern class been built strictly according to his timetable, the Imperial Navy would now possess a crucial force advantage in this war! (To be continued)