Chapter Eighty-One: Encounter in Battle

On the evening of September 8th, as they neared the Shetland Islands, Beatty dispatched several light cruisers on reconnaissance missions and ordered his battlecruiser squadron into combat readiness.

Although night combat was still largely unfamiliar to the navies of the world, the main warships were all equipped for it. If the opportunity arose, Beatty would not hesitate to launch a night raid against Raeder.

At that moment, Raeder was still lingering near the Shetland Islands, though he had shifted to the eastern side, ready to retreat eastward if necessary. Before Beatty sent out his scouts, Raeder had already dispatched his own light cruisers to watch the likely approach of the Grand Fleet, but he had few such vessels at his disposal.

Raeder commanded only six light cruisers. In contrast, Jellicoe had entrusted Beatty with half of the Grand Fleet’s light cruisers—twelve in all, with eight assigned to reconnaissance.

In this era before radar, reconnaissance relied entirely on the human eye. Whether with six or eight cruisers, the odds of spotting the enemy fleet depended largely on luck—though more cruisers slightly improved those odds. Despite Beatty deploying more cruisers, the advantage lay with Raeder: he knew the general direction from which the Grand Fleet would arrive, while Beatty had no idea of Raeder’s current whereabouts.

Before ten o’clock that night, one of Raeder’s light cruisers encountered Beatty’s battlecruiser squadron. Unfortunately, this ship, named Strasbourg, failed to spot the battlecruisers just over ten nautical miles away.

This was unsurprising—Beatty’s fleet was enforcing strict blackout procedures, and the skies above the sea were heavily clouded, severely limiting visibility. Even the most eagle-eyed lookout, armed with a precision Zeiss telescope, would struggle to make out a fleet so distant in such conditions.

Curiously, just half an hour later, one of Beatty’s own light cruisers brushed past Raeder’s forces. At that moment, the cruiser, named Lowestoft, passed within ten nautical miles of Raeder’s fleet. Because Raeder’s ships were also beneath the clouds, they escaped notice. Instead, a lookout aboard Moltke spotted a battleship exposed in a shaft of moonlight and immediately recognized it as a Birmingham-class light cruiser of the Royal Navy.

Yet, Raeder still had not found Beatty.

In the early hours of the ninth, the situation shifted dramatically. Once again, it was one of Raeder’s light cruisers that struck first.

Returning to base, the Magdeburg encountered a British light cruiser on a similar heading, though the latter failed to spot Magdeburg. After shadowing the British ship for nearly two hours, Magdeburg discovered the battlecruisers steaming at full speed toward the Shetland Islands, and identified the leading ship as Lion.

At around four in the morning, Magdeburg sent in her reconnaissance report. In truth, her captain made a mistake—Beatty’s flagship was not Lion, but the sister ship Princess Royal. At that time, both Lion and Princess Royal had been sent to the Mediterranean to deal with the Goeben, which had escaped to the Ottoman Empire.

A sharper lookout might have recognized this, but the impact of the error was not great.

Up to this point, Beatty had no inkling of Raeder’s movements, nor had he detected the German cruiser shadowing him at such close range.

The decision now fell to Raeder: to fight, or not to fight?

At half past four, Magdeburg relayed a more detailed report: the British force contained only four capital ships, all battlecruisers, with no battleships present.

This matched perfectly with Feng Chengqian’s prediction that Jellicoe had sent out his battlecruiser squadron to intercept Raeder.

The trouble was, Raeder did not know Feng Chengqian’s assessment of the situation. Although they could communicate by radio, the long-wave transmitters had limited capacity. Feng could only send Raeder brief, simple orders, not detailed strategic instructions.

At this point, Raeder hesitated. If Beatty’s battlecruisers were already here, then Jellicoe’s main fleet could not be far behind. To charge in now and engage Beatty risked blundering straight into Jellicoe’s battle line. Raeder knew full well that even if he defeated Beatty’s squadron, he could not stand against Jellicoe.

Yet, if he did not fight Beatty, he would likely fail to complete the mission assigned by Feng Chengqian.

By now, Hipper’s main fleet was entering the Skagerrak, hurrying toward the Shetland Islands. According to Feng’s plan, Raeder had to make contact with the Grand Fleet on the ninth and lure it into Hipper’s ambush.

Now it was the early morning of the ninth, dawn imminent.

After some thought, Raeder decided to turn and engage Beatty’s battlecruisers.

It was now past five o’clock. Around this time, one of Beatty’s light cruisers finally spotted Raeder and immediately sent a signal.

According to Royal Navy records, at around ten past five in the morning, the light cruiser Dublin sighted Raeder’s force ten nautical miles off and correctly identified the lead ship as the battlecruiser Moltke, along with two others. At that time, Raeder had formed five modernized “battlecruisers” into an independent detachment, which the British failed to spot.

Amusingly, Raeder did not see the British cruiser either.

In those conditions, Raeder’s fleet, having changed course, had left the cloud cover, while Dublin remained beneath it.

Upon receiving Dublin’s report, Beatty did not hesitate: he immediately ordered his squadron to turn and engage.

Undeniably, Beatty’s eagerness for battle played a significant role, but the intelligence from Dublin was decisive. Had Dublin reported all five battleships, Beatty would never have chosen to engage.

Battlecruisers were not battleships; their ability to withstand punishment was much less. In a battle between battlecruiser squadrons, numbers were crucial.

Every Royal Navy officer knew the importance of fleet strength. If the enemy had double his own force, no commander would choose to fight. Moreover, with Jellicoe’s main fleet close behind, Beatty could have waited for Raeder to come to him, using his speed advantage to hold Raeder in place until Jellicoe arrived.

Only when the enemy appeared weaker than his own force would Beatty act so aggressively.

At the time of Beatty’s decision, the two forces were nearly sixty nautical miles apart. Beatty believed Jellicoe was about sixty miles to his rear, so he thought he only had to hold out for two or three hours for Jellicoe to arrive. In reality, Jellicoe’s fleet was eighty miles behind. The fault was not Jellicoe’s slow pace, but Beatty’s own haste.

Thus, Beatty would have to hold out for four hours before Jellicoe could catch up.

With only four battlecruisers, could Beatty withstand four hours against eight enemy battlecruisers of equal strength?

On paper, the advantage belonged to Raeder. Beatty’s recklessness could well doom the Grand Fleet’s battlecruiser squadron.

Yet Raeder faced a problem—or rather, made a mistake.

When he resolved to engage Beatty, Raeder did not have the five ships of the “Crown Prince” group close up; instead, he kept his original formation.

Thus, only Moltke, Seydlitz, and Von der Tann were at the head of the pursuit. Although the five modernized older ships could all make over twenty-four knots—matching Von der Tann—they were still two knots slower than Moltke and Seydlitz.

Before turning to engage, these five ships already lagged nearly ten nautical miles to the rear. Now, at full speed, they fell even farther behind.

Clearly, when he met Beatty, Raeder had only three battlecruisers at hand; the remaining five could not join the fight for at least another hour.

Raeder had made a not inconsiderable mistake.

Yet, given the situation, he did not recognize it as such. First, Magdeburg had reported only two British capital ships, so Raeder believed he faced just two battlecruisers. More importantly, there was no reliable information about the Grand Fleet’s battlecruiser strength; even Feng Chengqian was unsure of their number. Raeder could hardly guess correctly. Furthermore, waiting for the five lagging ships to catch up might cause him to miss the chance for battle. Given the first factor, Raeder naturally concluded he must seize the opportunity to pin down Beatty and destroy the two battlecruisers he believed he faced.

Of course, this error did not bring entirely negative consequences.

Let us not forget, Beatty had no idea Raeder had another five warships in hand. Had Raeder concentrated his strength for battle, Beatty might have chosen to retreat after the first exchange. Confronted by just three battlecruisers, retreat was unlikely.

Clearly, both sides entered the fight with little real knowledge of the other.

This was, in every sense, a classic encounter battle.

At 6:45 in the morning, Beatty’s squadron came into Raeder’s sight, and Raeder was spotted in turn.

The first great naval battle of the First World War was about to begin.