Chapter Eighty-Two: Beyond Expectations

Before the battle commenced, Feng Chengqian received a telegram from Raeder.

Although Feng Chengqian was shocked and angry that Raeder had not strictly followed his orders, he did not instruct Raeder to retreat. Since the two fleets had already encountered each other, and Raeder had clearly stated that he had only sighted two battlecruisers and had not come across the main force of the enemy fleet, there was no need to withdraw. More importantly, ordering Raeder to retreat might backfire.

At the front, the situation was far from optimistic.

As soon as the engagement began, Raeder was confronted with a minor but troubling surprise: facing not two capital ships as expected, but four.

Fortunately, things had not deteriorated to the point of being unwinnable.

Of the four battlecruisers under Beatty’s command, the most formidable was undoubtedly the flagship “Queen Mary.” The “Indefatigable,” “Inflexible,” and “Invincible,” however, were somewhat outdated and suffered from serious design flaws—most notably the two “Invincible”-class ships.

To give one example, the two “Invincible”-class ships—“Inflexible” and “Invincible”—had two turrets staggered amidships, but their arcs of fire to the opposite beam were extremely limited, virtually preventing them from firing to the far side. Even the “Indefatigable” had insufficient cross-deck firing capability from its two central turrets. As a result, during line-of-battle engagements, “Inflexible” and “Invincible” could only bring six main guns to bear, and the “Indefatigable” could only unleash all eight in specific situations.

Clearly, these flaws were absent from the “Queen Mary.”

Raeder's three battlecruisers, of course, had no such limitations.

It was at this point that Feng Chengqian’s long-held principle in battleship design proved its worth: all main turrets on the three battlecruisers were arranged along the centerline, each capable of firing to either broadside and delivering full firepower across a wide arc.

Thus, only the “Queen Mary” could match the three German ships.

Upon contact, Raeder immediately ordered a turn. No matter what, Beatty had four battlecruisers while Raeder had only three for the moment.

More crucially, Raeder clearly intended to lure Beatty into the range of the five battleships advancing from the rear.

At this point, if Beatty had exercised any restraint or caution, he would have realized that Raeder would not retreat in the face of roughly equal strength.

Unfortunately, Beatty was not so prudent.

Seeing Raeder turn away with only three battlecruisers, Beatty promptly ordered pursuit.

While British battlecruisers did have design flaws, it was undeniable that speed was their clear advantage. Not only the “Indefatigable” and “Queen Mary,” but even the two “Invincible”-class ships could reach 25.5 knots, while “Moltke” topped out at 26 knots and “Von der Tann” could not reach 25.

Britain’s emphasis on speed in battlecruisers was entirely understandable, since their primary mission was to chase down enemy heavy cruisers on the open sea.

In contrast, the Imperial German Navy had no clear operational doctrine for battlecruisers.

Indeed, when Feng Chengqian served as Minister of Naval War, he opposed building battlecruisers altogether, believing resources should be devoted to constructing more balanced battleships.

Of course, Beatty did not know that Raeder’s turn was not an attempt to flee.

As a result, while Raeder completed his maneuver, Beatty was still reorganizing his formation, missing the chance to seize the initiative and fire first.

What did this mean?

Tactically, Beatty missed his only opportunity to defeat Raeder quickly, and also the best chance to lure Raeder into Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet.

Once the battle began, Raeder’s intentions were crystal clear.

Under his command, during the first five minutes, all three German ships focused their fire on the “Queen Mary.”

It was only when the shells began to rain down that Beatty realized Raeder hadn’t meant to flee but was executing a tactical maneuver—and he had missed his window.

In just five minutes, “Queen Mary” endured the full brunt of twenty-seven 300-mm guns.

Even a battleship would struggle to withstand such a barrage, let alone a battlecruiser. What’s more, Beatty had closed the range to about 12,000 meters during his pursuit of Raeder, at which distance the “Queen Mary’s” thin armor was virtually useless.

The accuracy of the German gunnery was also notable. By then, the Germans were using a stepped aiming method, while the British still relied on the outdated continuous aim.

According to Royal Navy records, in those five minutes, “Queen Mary” was struck directly by at least seven 300-mm armor-piercing shells and twenty-eight 150-mm shells, with another fourteen 300-mm shells landing nearby. Her bow was nearly obliterated. At least one 300-mm shell hit the bridge but failed to explode—a stroke of luck for Beatty, as an explosion would have wiped out dozens of officers and men, including himself.

The “Queen Mary” withstood the storm, buying precious time for the other three battlecruisers.

Remarkably, even after such devastation, “Queen Mary’s” B turret, the main turret forward of the bridge, could still fire.

It must be admitted, however, that Raeder too missed his best chance to turn the tide.

Given the circumstances, had he managed to sink or even seriously damage the “Queen Mary,” Raeder could have changed the course of the battle in a single stroke.

As it was, by the time Beatty completed his maneuver, Raeder still faced four enemy capital ships.

Still, the five-minute barrage was not without effect.

For one, “Queen Mary’s” A turret was destroyed, costing her a quarter of her firepower. Moreover, at the last moment, a 300-mm shell from the “Derfflinger” struck the main mast, damaging the radio aerials—crippling “Queen Mary’s” ability to communicate with the fleet and forcing her to rely on flag signals.

This shot was crucial.

Before it landed, Beatty had already reported to Jellicoe that he had encountered the High Seas Fleet’s battlecruisers and that only three enemy ships were engaged. Importantly, he had also stated that his own battlecruiser squadron held a sufficient advantage and did not yet require support.

It was this very message that convinced Jellicoe to continue with the original plan—not to hasten to battle.

At the time, Jellicoe had every reason to believe that if he brought up the main fleet, Raeder would simply withdraw. Leaving Beatty to engage, however, increased the chance of destroying Raeder’s squadron. Bagging three enemy battlecruisers would be a fine result in itself.

Neither Beatty nor Jellicoe realized that Raeder was thinking along the same lines.

Though Beatty still had the advantage, Raeder did not intend to retreat; behind him, five more battleships led by the “Crown Prince” were racing forward at 24 knots. In other words, if Raeder could hold out for just one hour, overwhelming superiority would be his.

Would it be difficult for Raeder to last an hour?

Clearly not.

Even when the enemy completed their formation, Beatty’s advantage was far from decisive.

As the battle entered its decisive phase, Raeder’s flagship, the “Moltke,” concentrated fire on “Queen Mary.” The “Derfflinger” targeted “Indefatigable,” while the “Von der Tann” engaged both “Inflexible” and “Invincible,” relieving pressure on the other two German ships.

Curiously, Beatty made the same choice.

To him, having “Inflexible” and “Invincible” focus their fire on the weakest, “Von der Tann,” offered the best chance for a swift victory.

Unfortunately, Beatty’s intentions were not fully realized.

Originally, “Indefatigable” was to engage the “Derfflinger,” but once battle commenced, she instead aimed at the “Moltke.” This was not Beatty’s fault, nor that of “Indefatigable’s” captain, but resulted from the flag lieutenant misreading the signals. The outcome, however, was the same: “Derfflinger” was able to fire on “Indefatigable” almost unopposed.

In a fleet action, this was nearly unthinkable.

Under such circumstances, “Derfflinger” could, as if on the gunnery range, lob heavy armor-piercing shells at the distant enemy.

Of course, this also meant Raeder’s flagship would have to withstand double the fire.

By this point, the situation was clear.

Two ships had become pivotal: “Moltke” and “Indefatigable.” Whichever could endure longer would likely decide the battle for her fleet.

Evidently, Beatty’s chances were better.

After all, “Indefatigable” was only taking fire from one ship, while “Moltke” was under attack from two.

But luck was not on Beatty’s side.

At 7:17, six minutes into the decisive phase, a tremendous explosion rocked “Indefatigable.”

Just two minutes later, before Beatty even understood what had happened, “Indefatigable” vanished from the sea. According to lookouts, the explosion erupted at her forward turret, likely caused by an armor-piercing shell penetrating the magazine. Later inspections of the wreck confirmed that a shell from the “Derfflinger” had struck “Indefatigable’s” A turret, detonating inside and igniting the cordite propellant stored within. In their haste to maintain a high rate of fire, the gun crew had left the passage between turret and magazine open, allowing flames to sweep into the magazine and set off hundreds of shells. It was this catastrophic magazine explosion that sent “Indefatigable” to the bottom in two minutes.

Less than ten minutes into the battle, “Indefatigable” was lost—utterly beyond Beatty’s expectations.