Chapter 102: Annihilation

It can be stated with certainty that in a fight of thirteen against twenty-three, Hipper had no chance of winning.

The problem was, the strength comparison was not so straightforward.

Around 11:40, Jellicoe spotted four battleships that had fallen behind, and immediately ordered the Fourth Battle Squadron to focus its attack on those four German ships.

Clearly, this was another mistake Jellicoe made in this battle.

At that time, the four lagging German battleships were not separated from the main fleet due to heavy damage but because their power systems had been overloaded for dozens of hours, on the verge of failure. Should a malfunction occur during combat, they would be sitting ducks for enemy ships. After obtaining Hipper’s permission, the commander of the Fourth Battle Squadron ordered a reduction in speed by two knots.

In fact, the condition of these four capital ships was still quite good.

Jellicoe’s misjudgment resulted in a very serious consequence: six battleships were assigned to confront the four battleships of the High Seas Fleet.

Though Jellicoe dispatched the six weakest battleships in the Grand Fleet, he was up against the four weakest battleships of the High Seas Fleet.

The result was that Jellicoe was left with only seventeen battleships in the main formation, while Hipper had thirteen.

Undeniably, the advantage still lay with Jellicoe, but it was no longer as pronounced.

What followed was something completely unexpected by Jellicoe: Beatty’s battlecruiser squadron, after suffering heavy blows, withdrew from the fight on their own initiative.

Clearly, this was thanks to Raeder.

After the clash between Hipper and Jellicoe began, Raeder first withdrew according to the established tactics. However, he didn’t go far, because he needed to keep an eye on Beatty’s squadron, which was still lingering nearby. This was also one of the Imperial Navy’s standard tactics: during fleet engagements, the battlecruiser squadrons were responsible for clearing enemy vessels around the battlefield, preventing enemy battlecruisers from threatening the main fleet.

Initially, von Chengqian opposed the construction of battlecruisers.

His reasoning was straightforward: battlecruisers were a product of the Royal Navy’s sea control doctrine. The Imperial Navy’s concept of sea power differed greatly from that of the Royal Navy. Therefore, ships suitable for the Royal Navy were not necessarily suitable for the Imperial Navy, so there was no need to follow the trend blindly.

Interestingly, von Chengqian was the very person who sparked the battlecruiser construction boom.

Don’t forget, it was during the design of the Friedrich der Große—later named the Kronprinz—that von Chengqian prioritized speed above all, influencing Fisher and prompting the Royal Navy to follow suit by designing and building multiple classes of battlecruisers, including the Invincible class.

As the Royal Navy embarked on large-scale battlecruiser construction, von Chengqian then led the design and construction of the Brummer battlecruiser. After von Chengqian left the Imperial Navy Ministry, Tirpitz, adhering to a “if you have them, so do we” philosophy, approved the construction of the Von der Tann, Mackensen class, Derfflinger, and Seydlitz class battlecruisers.

The question remained: what exactly was the significance of battlecruisers to the Imperial Navy?

Obviously, the Imperial Navy did not have long maritime routes to protect. Even if it did, without sea control, a few battlecruisers alone could not provide adequate protection.

The Imperial Navy had to find an appropriate role for its costly battlecruisers.

And, of course, this role had to align with the overall strategy of the Imperial Navy.

Thus, within the Imperial Navy, the primary value of battlecruisers was to assist the main fleet in battle, covering and protecting the main battleship force during decisive engagements.

This was precisely the mission Raeder was executing.

In fact, at that time, Beatty was also pondering how best to aid Jellicoe.

Clearly, Beatty would not withdraw. The reason was simple: he shared the same concern that if left unchecked, Raeder would surely engage Jellicoe. Although Jellicoe had numerical superiority in ships, even combining Hipper’s and Raeder’s forces only matched Jellicoe’s strength, Raeder’s speed advantage meant that as long as he joined the fight, the balance would be upset.

Beatty’s only option was to hold Raeder back.

The problem was, Beatty had only three battlecruisers. Although Raeder’s six battlecruisers were damaged in the earlier fighting, Beatty’s three were similarly battered.

What was worse, the presence of the Lion slowed Beatty’s squadron noticeably compared to Raeder’s.

In essence, Beatty’s desperate attempt to restrain Raeder was tantamount to a death sentence.

Of course, Raeder understood this clearly. Beatty was merely buying Jellicoe time, and the longer Raeder fought Beatty, the worse it was for Hipper. Raeder had to quickly eliminate Beatty to support Hipper in defeating Jellicoe.

This time, Raeder fought with great initiative.

After withdrawing from battle, he first reorganized his formation, temporarily pulling the heavily damaged Kronprinz back and assigning a light cruiser to escort her. Then, Raeder chose the simplest tactic: directly charging toward the slower Beatty.

Did Beatty have any choice?

At that moment, Beatty had no real options. He could either retreat or fight Raeder to the death. If he chose to retreat, Raeder would not pursue relentlessly but would quickly return to the battlefield to assist Hipper in defeating Jellicoe.

Beatty did not retreat; he chose to fight Raeder to the bitter end.

From the moment he made this decision, Beatty knew his fate would be grim. Perhaps Jellicoe could return to port by luck, but Beatty had no such chance—his numerical disadvantage against Raeder was even greater, and hope for victory was slim.

The fierce, close-quarters duel between the battlecruisers began at 11:15 and lasted less than an hour.

Undeniably, Beatty’s valiant resistance nearly altered the outcome of the battle.

During that hour of combat, the Lion, Queen Mary, and Invincible held on to the very end. When the Invincible sank, she was still firing her two remaining undamaged secondary guns at the approaching German ships. Not a single officer or crewman aboard these three battlecruisers abandoned ship prematurely.

The brutal fight proved that battlecruisers were fundamentally unsuited for fleet actions.

In intense artillery duels, the lightly armored battlecruisers were easily destroyed and prone to catastrophic magazine explosions.

Both the Lion and Queen Mary went down due to magazine detonations.

Although the Invincible’s magazine did not explode, she sank after being struck by dozens of large-caliber armor-piercing shells.

Of course, Raeder suffered huge losses as well.

Driven by eagerness for victory, Raeder treated his battlecruisers like battleships. Though he sank three British ships in less than an hour, by battle’s end, two of his six ships—the Augusta Victoria and the Kronprinz Wilhelm—were nearly sunk. The Kaiserin and Kaiser had only one turret left operational, and the Derfflinger was listing nearly ten degrees to port. Only the Kronprinz, which had not engaged immediately, was in slightly better condition.

It could only be described as a costly victory.

Though the Augusta Victoria and Kronprinz Wilhelm barely made it back to Wilhelmshaven, both lay in dockyards for over a year before rejoining the High Seas Fleet.

Beatty’s squadron was completely annihilated, extinguishing Jellicoe’s last hope for victory.

After destroying Beatty’s three battlecruisers, Raeder did not pursue the fleeing smaller ships. He left two light cruisers to clear the battlefield and arranged for the battle-worn Augusta Victoria and Kronprinz Wilhelm to withdraw. Then, he led the four still combat-capable battlecruisers to join Hipper, preparing to combine forces against Jellicoe.

At that moment, Hipper saw a chance for victory.

Upon receiving Raeder’s telegram, Hipper’s first reaction was to order Raeder to use his speed advantage to seize a favorable position ahead of the battle line.

If Raeder could secure such a position, even four battered battlecruisers could pose a lethal threat to Jellicoe. More importantly, with Raeder present, Jellicoe could not retreat unscathed; he would have to leave part of his main force behind as rear guard.

Hipper never intended to annihilate Jellicoe’s fleet, but he hoped to achieve a greater result.

The problem was, Hipper overlooked one crucial point: did Raeder still have his speed advantage after the fierce battle with Beatty?

Although Raeder returned with four battlecruisers, all were in poor condition, with top speeds under twenty knots. Moreover, the heavy damage made Raeder reluctant to push beyond twenty knots.

To minimize hull flooding, Raeder had to keep speeds below sixteen knots.

Clearly, Raeder had lost his most important advantage.

By then, it was already 1 p.m.

After careful consideration, Jellicoe decided to retreat at 1:10 p.m. He immediately ordered the light cruisers accompanying the main fleet to launch torpedo attacks to disrupt the High Seas Fleet.

At that time, Raeder had just received Hipper’s telegram.

Seeing Jellicoe prepare to withdraw, Raeder could only watch helplessly.

At 1:40 p.m., Hipper completed the battle against the British light cruisers, sinking five and forcing a heavily damaged one to scuttle herself. However, Hipper missed the chance to pursue Jellicoe. During that half hour, Jellicoe not only completed a turn but also extended the distance to about thirty kilometers. More importantly, Jellicoe’s fleet maintained a speed of around twenty knots.

Realizing he could not catch Jellicoe, Hipper ordered a withdrawal.

By then, the battle zone had shifted to about fifteen nautical miles north of the Dogger Bank shoals.

(To be continued)