Chapter 121: Perfect Timing

At the beginning of 1915, it was not Great Britain, but Russia, that found itself in the most precarious position.

The disastrous defeats suffered by the Russian army in Poland and Silesia had nearly brought the vast Russian Empire to its knees. In little over a month, the Russians had lost nearly two million soldiers—a toll difficult to bear even for a nation with a population exceeding one hundred million.

By the end of March, Romania’s decision to join the Central Powers further exacerbated Russia’s war burden. Following Romania’s entry into the conflict, the front line that Russia was required to defend extended by nearly a thousand kilometers, exposing the vulnerable flank of Ukraine.

These military defeats and diplomatic failures ignited a new wave of revolution within Russia. Although the Tsar repeatedly assured Britain and France that Russia was capable of stabilizing the domestic situation and maintaining the existing front, everyone knew that Russia was at risk of collapse at any moment.

Could Russia be saved?

To rescue Russia, the British Prime Minister had explicitly proposed to France that, in addition to launching a decisive strategic offensive on the Western Front as soon as possible, they must open the maritime route to Russia by attacking the Ottoman Empire and seizing control of the Dardanelles, the gateway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

Unfortunately, France did not believe it had the capacity to capture the Dardanelles. Instead, it argued that dispatching troops to the Ottoman Empire would inevitably divert forces from the Western Front, hindering the Allied effort to launch a strategic offensive there. If the Allies could not secure the initiative on the Western Front, any action in the Near East would be futile.

Stalemated with France, the British Prime Minister turned his attention to Japan in the Far East. After the war began, Britain had actively encouraged its treaty ally to join the fight, but Japan, citing provisions in the alliance, had not immediately assumed the responsibilities of war, primarily because Britain had not yet agreed to certain conditions Japan had set for its participation.

By the beginning of 1915, however, Britain was losing its patience.

Although Japan was on the other side of the globe, its role could not be underestimated. If for no other reason, if Britain wished to avoid opening a new front in the Far East, it had to leverage Japan to contain the land and naval forces of the German Empire and use Japan to strike against it.

More importantly, Japan had become the primary source of aid to Russia.

With the Baltic and Black Seas blockaded and no way to secure the Arctic Ocean route, the ports of the Far East became Russia’s only channel for foreign aid. At that time, 95 percent of all supplies destined for Russia were shipped through Japan to Russian Far Eastern ports, then transported via the Trans-Siberian Railway to the European front. Only a negligible amount of supplies entered through Central Asia and Iran.

Yet, compared to the immense consumption of the war, this aid was but a drop in the bucket.

By the end of March, just how dire was Russia’s situation?

Although the total strength of the Russian army on the Eastern Front remained above six million, the supplies reaching the front line were only sufficient for ten days of operations. Even more critical was the severe shortage of ammunition; infantrymen were allocated only a few bullets each, and machine guns had fewer than one hundred rounds in reserve.

Across the front, the German army faced no such problems.

If Russia did not receive external aid, this powerful empire—which had once acted as the arbiter of the European continent—would be defeated within six months.

The burden of aiding Russia fell upon Britain.

On the final day of March, the British Prime Minister, Bonar Law, reached an agreement with the French President in Paris: France would undertake the primary combat duties on the Western Front, Britain would cap its expeditionary force there at one million men, and any surplus troops would be dispatched to the Mediterranean, alongside ten infantry divisions to be provided by France.

In short, Britain and France would open a new theater of war in the Mediterranean as soon as possible.

Strategically, defeating the Ottoman Empire and forcing the Dardanelles was the best option for aiding Russia, as it was the only obstruction on that route. More importantly, the Ottoman Empire was far inferior to the German Empire and thus easier for the Anglo-French forces to defeat.

The problem was that no one could guarantee the defeat of the Ottoman Empire within a few months.

While the Allies could reinforce the Mediterranean, the German Empire could provide similar support to the Ottoman Empire, ensuring it would not lose its vital gateway.

If the Ottoman Empire could not be defeated quickly, the only remaining option was the route into the Baltic Sea.

This would require the British Royal Navy to defeat the German Imperial Navy, open the way into the Baltic, and seize command of the sea. In truth, even if they committed to the Mediterranean, the Royal Navy would still need to defeat its most formidable opponent.

The entire burden fell squarely upon the Royal Navy.

In early April, upon returning to London, Bonar Law immediately approved the shipbuilding plan submitted by the Royal Navy, tripling the number of warships to be constructed over the next three years.

Clearly, this was very similar to the German Empire’s own naval expansion program.

Likewise, the focus was not merely on the new ships, but on those already under construction, such as the battlecruiser *Tiger* and the *Queen Elizabeth*-class battleships.

The issue was that these vessels would not be operational immediately, while the problems facing the Royal Navy were urgent.

By mid-April, the Royal Navy had confirmed that three battlecruisers of the High Seas Fleet were undergoing refits and would soon become commerce raiders. From this, it was not difficult for the Royal Navy to discern the intentions of the German Imperial Navy: once they had secured partial command of the sea, they would begin a strategic blockade of Britain, cutting off maritime routes and preventing the island nation from obtaining war materials from abroad.

For Britain, this was undoubtedly a noose being tightened around its neck.

Should the German Empire tighten this noose further, Britain would be strangled.

Even more severe was the fact that, without absolute command of the sea, Britain could not solve this dilemma. The only way to stop the German Empire’s commerce raiding was to achieve absolute naval supremacy, forcing the High Seas Fleet’s raiders to remain in port.

This required the Royal Navy to be more aggressive.

In a sense, this was the primary reason for Jellicoe’s resignation, as he knew the Grand Fleet could hardly defeat the High Seas Fleet in a single engagement; instead, it risked defeat in a decisive battle, thereby losing any chance of ever securing absolute command of the sea.

At the time, it was not only Jellicoe who realized this, but the vast majority of Royal Navy commanders.

The problem was that if the Grand Fleet remained hunkered down in Scapa Flow, the High Seas Fleet would be free to enter and exit the North Sea, and those commerce raiders would be able to penetrate the North Atlantic without hindrance.

Clearly, the decision of whether to fight did not rest with the Royal Navy alone.

In late April, another event prompted the Royal Navy to take action as soon as possible. After nearly two months of rest, the *Berlin* once again departed Wilhelmshaven, entered the North Sea under the cover of the High Seas Fleet, and began its second commerce-raiding operation.

This time, it was not von Chengqian, but Captain Strang who commanded the *Berlin*.

On von Chengqian’s recommendation, Strang had become the captain of the *Berlin* and was tasked with the mission of the second commerce-raiding operation.

Unlike the previous sortie, the *Berlin* entered the North Sea this time under the protection of the High Seas Fleet.

Von Chengqian’s intent was clear: if the Grand Fleet came to intercept, he would engage it in a decisive battle; otherwise, he would escort the *Berlin* out of the North Sea.

The Grand Fleet did indeed leave Scapa Flow, but it did not go to intercept the *Berlin*.

Three days later, the *Berlin* exited the North Sea east of the Faroe Islands. The High Seas Fleet returned to Wilhelmshaven three days after that, and the Grand Fleet returned to Scapa Flow on May 1st.

On May 4th, after a brief rest, the High Seas Fleet departed port once more.

This operation was again planned by von Chengqian.

Although there was no intelligence indicating that the Grand Fleet would pursue the *Berlin*, which had already entered the North Atlantic, the British Royal Navy had by now received the battlecruiser *Tiger*. If Beatty were in command of the Grand Fleet, von Chengqian had reason to believe he would lead the fleet out for a decisive engagement.

Regardless, the Grand Fleet remained stronger than the High Seas Fleet.

The key was whether Beatty had the resolve to lead the Grand Fleet out to fight.

Of course, this action by the High Seas Fleet was also related to the ground war. At the end of April, von Chengqian received word that Ludendorff had planned a new offensive, to be launched no later than May 10th. If all went well, Ludendorff would achieve a major victory by the end of May. The harder the German army pressed on the Eastern Front, the more precarious Russia’s position became, and the more Britain needed to turn the tide in the maritime theater.

Furthermore, the Western Front was far from quiet.

Although Falkenhayn had followed the Kaiser’s orders to keep the Western Front in a defensive posture, he was tactically anything but passive. In April alone, the German army on the Western Front launched six limited tactical offensives, effectively delaying the Allies' preparations for an attack. On April 24th, the German army even encircled and annihilated over one hundred thousand French troops in the Verdun region, nearly leading to the ousting of the French Commander-in-Chief, Joffre.

Clearly, it was unlikely that the Allied forces would launch a strategic offensive on the Western Front in the near term.

These factors forced Britain to take action in the maritime theater, and the most effective action would be to defeat the High Seas Fleet in a decisive battle.

By leading the High Seas Fleet out of port at this time, von Chengqian was intent on giving the Royal Navy exactly that opportunity.

Of course, who would defeat whom would only be revealed once the battle concluded.

So, would the Grand Fleet come out to fight?

In fact, as early as late April, Beatty had proposed a decisive battle with the High Seas Fleet, but he had been firmly opposed by Bonar Law and the Secretary of State for War, Kitchener. Both believed the time was not yet ripe for a clash, and that Britain’s priorities lay on the Western Front and the soon-to-be-opened Mediterranean theater. At the time, Kitchener had even suggested diverting some capital ships to the Mediterranean.

Now that the High Seas Fleet had come knocking on their door, could the Grand Fleet still afford to cower in port?